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Abstract
This thesis explores channels through which human capital accumulation can
be fostered focusing in particular on education policies. Chapter 1 analyzes
the effects of the UK Widening Participation Policies which aim at raising the
motivation towards school of teenagers from low socio-economic background.
I use a Sharp Regression Discontinuity design to estimate the effects of raising
aspirations on college enrollments. The estimates obtained show that the policy
had a significant positive impact on pupils’ aspirations and on their propensity
to stay on in education after the age of 16, but did not affect college enrollment
rates except for pupils coming from richer families. To interpret these empiri-
cal results I build a model of schooling choice that incorporates non cognitive
traits such as aspirations in the ability production function. Chapter 2 again
focuses on tertiary education policies and looks at an Italian reform which
generated a substantial geographical expansion of tertiary education supply. I
implement a Difference-in-Differences analysis and find that the reform signif-
icantly increased girls’ enrollment rates but not boys’; on the other hand, boys
substituted education away from home with education at the local university.
These results suggest that girls face some non financial cost of moving away
from home which may eventually prevent them from attending college. Chap-
ter 3 analyzes the impact of parental migration on the household investments
on the human capital of children left behind. I frame the household decision
making problem as a sequential game in which the migrant spouse decides
how much remittances to send back and then the one left behind allocates the
total available budget according to his preferences. Such model predicts that
the migrant anticipates the spouse’s choice and manages to offset the possible
negative impact on expenditure for children. The model predictions are tested
using data from Indonesia.
Contents
Introduction 1
1 Raising Aspirations and Higher Education: Lessons from the UK Widen-
ing Participation Policies 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2 The Widening Participation Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.1 Policy Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.2 Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3.2 Solution and Predictions in the case of perfect credit markets . . . . 14
1.3.3 Solution and Predictions in the case of binding credit constraints . . 16
1.4 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5.1 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6.1 Aspirations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6.2 Drop out at 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6.3 Higher Education Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6.4 Analysis of heterogeneous effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.6.5 Evidence on cross-productivity effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.7 Specification checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.9 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.10 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.10.1 Proof that ∂h
∗
∂a < 0, in the case of binding credit constraints . . . . . 50
1.10.2 Summary of effects of raising aspirations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
iii
2 Home or Away?
Gender differences in the effects of an expansion of tertiary education
supply 52
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 The Italian university system and the reform of 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.4 Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6 Mechanisms: the role of financial and cultural
constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.7 Specification checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.8 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.9 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.10 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.10.1 Labor Market Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.10.2 Partition of Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3 When the cat’s away...
The effects of spousal migration on investments on children 94
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2 A model of household migration choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.2.1 The choice of the migrant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.2.2 The allocation of resources within the household . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.4 Estimation Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.6 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.7 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.8 Tables and Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
References 126
iv
List of Figures
1.1 London Target Areas. 2001 Census wards, by youth participation rate.
HEFCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Likelihood of applying to university at age 18. LSYPE waves 1-5. . . . . . . 25
1.3 Widening Participation activities carried out by a sample of colleges. . . . . 32
1.4 Aspirations: probability of stating to be likely to apply to university. . . . . 35
1.5 Aspirations: WP effect by bandwidth. LSYPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6 Probability of staying on in full time education at age 16, QLFS and LSYPE. 37
1.7 Probability of staying on in full time education at age 16: WP effect by
bandwidth. QLFS and LSYPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.8 Probability of enrolling to a Higher Education Institution at age 18. QLFS
and LSYPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.9 Probability of enrolling to a Higher Education Institution at age 18: WP
effect by bandwidth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.10 Effect on academic achievements at age 18. NPD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.11 Effect on academic achievements at age 18: WP effect by bandwidth. . . . . 44
1.12 Distribution of main covariates across the discontinuity threshold. QLFS. . 46
1.13 Distribution of main covariates across the discontinuity threshold. LSYPE. 46
2.1 Average number of degrees offered to high school graduates per province,
by type of degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Variation in the supply of tertiary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.3 Treated and Control Provinces, by Variety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 Average Variety of Tertiary Education Supply in Treatment and Control
Provinces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5 The role of cultural models: time use and the effects of the reform on
enrollment rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.6 Specification checks: common trend in log GDP per capita. . . . . . . . . . 70
2.7 Employment Rates by gender and educational attainment. Source: Istat,
Labour Force Survey, 2004. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.1 Returns-Risk Profiles of Migration Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
v
3.2 Expected Wages and Returns from Migration Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3 Expected Risk from Migration Portfolios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
vi
List of Tables
1.1 Descriptive Statistics for QLFS and LSYPE samples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.2 Descriptive Statistics for NPD sample. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.3 Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on aspirations. . . . 36
1.4 Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on Schooling Choices
at 16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on Schooling Choices
at 18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.6 Heterogeneous effects by income quantile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.7 Heterogeneous effects by cognitive ability quantile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.8 Heterogeneous effects by income and cognitive ability quantile. . . . . . . . 43
1.9 Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on academic achieve-
ments at age 18. NPD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.10 Specification Checks: Distribution of main covariates across the disconti-
nuity threshold. Non parametric Estimates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.11 Specification Checks: Falsification exercise. LSYPE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.12 Specification Checks: Falsification exercise. QLFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.1 Descriptive Statistics by Variety Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.2 Rates of Enrollment within same year of high school graduation . . . . . . . 78
2.3 Regional Mobility Rates by Gender and Geographical Area . . . . . . . . . 78
2.4 Inter-province Mobility Rates by Gender and Geographical Area . . . . . . 78
2.5 Individual characteristics by enrollment and mobility status . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6 Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied. Probit difference-
in-differences estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied. Probit difference-
in-differences estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.8 Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied. Heckman 2-Step
difference-in-differences estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.9 Correlation Coefficients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
vii
2.10 The mechanisms: Enrollment Decisions. Probit difference-in-differences es-
timation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.11 The mechanisms: Mobility Decisions. Heckman 2-Step difference-in-differences
estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
2.12 Placebo Test: Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied be-
tween 1995 and 1999. Probit difference-in-differences estimation. . . . . . . 84
2.13 Placebo Test. Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied be-
tween 1995 and 1999. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
2.14 Instrumental Variables Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.15 Robustness Checks: Excluding Big Cities. ATET. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.16 Sensitivity to threshold. Enrollment Decisions. Probit difference-in-differences
estimation. ATET. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.17 Sensitivity to threshold. Mobility Decisions. ATET. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.18 Results under different definitions of Treatment. Probit difference-in-differences
estimation. ATET. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.19 Results under different definitions of Treatment. ATET. . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.20 Educational Achievements. ATET. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.21 Treated Provinces according to different definitions of treatment. . . . . . . 93
3.1 Migration in the IFLS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.2 Migrants by gender. IFLS 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3 Migration portfolio choices of households with kids. IFLS 2007. . . . . . . . 105
3.4 Migrants per village. IFLS 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.5 Expected Returns and Risk from Migration Portfolios (log). . . . . . . . . . 108
3.6 Households’ Characteristics. IFLS 2007. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.7 Household income levels and shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.8 Household gender specific destinations, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.9 OLS Estimation. Household Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.10 First Stage Regression. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
3.11 Two Stage Least Squares Estimation. Household Level. . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.12 Robustness Checks: IV Estimates, only one instrument . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.13 Robustness Checks: Weak Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.14 Robustness Checks: Exogenous Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
viii
3.15 Robustness Checks: Montecarlo Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
ix
Introduction
There is such a thing as investment in human capital as well as investment in
material capital. So soon as this is recognized, the distinction between economy
in consumption and economy in investment becomes blurred. For, up to a point,
consumption is investment in personal productive capacity. This is especially
important in connection with children: to reduce unduly expenditure on their
consumption may greatly lower their efficiency in after-life.
With these words, Arthur Pigou introduced the term “human capital” in the economic
literature in 1928 (Pigou, 1928). The idea that human beings are endowed with a certain
stock of skills and capacities that can boost development and growth, nevertheless, was
not new at all to economists, being already clearly stated in 1776 by Adam Smith who
generically labeled such abilities as “talents” (Smith, 1776).
Cultivating these talents, as Smith would say, or investing in human capital, in the lan-
guage of modern economists, entails an incredibly vast range of actions which go from
neonatal breastfeeding (Rothstein, 2013) and infant vaccinations (Miguel and Kremer,
2004) up to training on the job of adult workers (Black and Lynch, 1996).
The three chapters of this thesis delve into the mechanisms behind investment in human
capital accumulation in adolescent years (chapters 1 and 2) and in earlier childhood (chap-
ter 3) providing evidence on the way individuals and households decide how much of the
available resources to invest in education at different stages of life.
Chapter 1 looks at the effects of a policy initiative introduced in the UK in the late
Nineties that aimed at raising the aspirations and motivation of teenagers towards higher
education in order to increase the rate of enrollment to college of pupils from low socio-
economic background.
I study the effects of this policy using the framework of a model of investment in human
capital where individuals choose how much time to spend in school depending on their
financial resources (parental income) and their ability, which incorporate both a cogni-
tive and a non cognitive component. The model predicts that in the absence of credit
constraints, a raise in aspirations will always have a weakly positive effect on the level
of accumulated human capital, the effect being null if cognitive and non cognitive skills
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are perfect complements and positive otherwise. On the other hand, in the presence of
borrowing constraints, individuals will respond to an increase in their ability by lowering
the amount of time invested in school and the final effect will depend on the relative pro-
ductivity of ability with respect to time in the production of human capital.
The model is brought to the data in the context of the UK Widening Participation pol-
icy, whose scheme allows me to use a Sharp Regression Discontinuity design based on a
measure of participation to higher education of older cohorts living in the same neighbor-
hood. The results show that the policy intervention generated a significant increase in the
aspirations of teenagers about higher education and that, as a consequence, these stayed
longer in full time education. Yet, the rates of enrollment to college were not affected by
the policy if not for students coming from the most aﬄuent families, thus signaling the
existence of binding credit constraints for a faction of the population.
In turn this chapter contributes to the recent economic literature that looks at the effects
of non cognitive skills on individual choices by shedding some light on the responsiveness
of these traits during adolescence and on the interaction between these, cognitive skills
and parental financial resources in determining human capital investment choices.
In chapter 2 I explore another dimension of human capital investment choices which
is how high school graduates respond to a geographical expansion in the supply of college
education. I use data from Italy, where a number of reforms implemented in 2001 led to a
massive growth of small and peripheral college campuses and analyze how boys and girls
consequently changed their enrollment and mobility decisions. The geographical varia-
tion with which the reform was implemented allows me to use a difference-in-differences
strategy whose results reveal that boys and girls reacted very differently to the reform:
girls’ enrollment rates rose by about six percentage points whereas boys did not increase
their overall participation to college but rather switched from studying away from home
to studying at the local college as this was made available. Analysis of heterogeneity in
the results further reveals that among girls, those whose families were more aﬄuent ex-
hibited a larger propensity to switch from studying away from home to studying at the
local college which suggests that girls face a non financial cost of moving from home which
may eventually prevent them from attending higher education at all. Indeed all students
revealed a preference towards studying at the local university but, while boys could just
substitute this option with a farther away college, girls rather dropped out of school.
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In conclusion this paper provides meaningful insights about the way boys and girls value
the benefits and the costs associated to investing in human capital accumulation at the
stage of college choice revealing the existence of potential obstacles to an efficient alloca-
tion of human resources.
Finally, chapter 3 drives attention to an earlier stage of life looking at investment in
the human capital of children. In this setting it is the parents that decide how much of
the household budget to spend for the consumption, the education and the health of their
children in a setting in which each parent cares about her own consumption and both care
about the children.
I study the allocation of the family budget on expenditure for children in the case in which
one of the parents migrates and leaves the children behind together with the spouse. A
theoretical model in which the two spouses sequentially choose how much remittances to
send back to the household (the migrant spouse) and how to distribute the total available
budget made of own income and received remittances (the spouse left behind) is used to
interpret the empirical results. The model predicts that, even in the presence of different
preferences between the two spouses over the allocation of the budget between own and
children related consumption, the share of total household income spent on children will
not be affected by which of the parent migrates. This is due to the possibility of the
migrant spouse to anticipate the partner’s choice and incorporate it in the decision of how
much remittances to send back.
The empirical part of the paper relies on data from Indonesia, a country where female
migration is particularly high, and exploits variation in the expected returns and risk
associated to respectively female and male migration to instrument for the household’s
choice of which spouse to send away for migration. The empirical results are in line with
the model’s predictions and show that there is no difference in the share of family resources
spent on children between the case in which the father migrates and that in which it is
the mother. This suggests that migration of young women who temporarily leave their
children behind does not determine a decrease in the amount of resources spent for children
as long as women can choose how much to send back through remittances. This result
carries particular relevance in the light of the increasing migration flows of women around
the world, a phenomenon which creates concern in the international political arena for the
possible detrimental effects on children left behind.
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Chapter 1
Raising Aspirations and Higher
Education: Lessons from the UK
Widening Participation Policies
Abstract
This paper explores the impact of a non cognitive trait, aspirations, on college attendance.
The relationship between aspirations and schooling is framed in a model of inter temporal
consumption where returns to education and success in school depend on individual ability
which incorporates a non cognitive component. According to the model, the final impact
of an exogenous raise in the level of non cognitive skills will depend on the degree of
substitutability between cognitive skills, non cognitive skills and parental background in
the production of ability, but also on credit accessibility.
The model’s predictions are tested exploiting a national scale British policy intervention,
Widening Participation, aimed at raising the motivation towards school of pupils from
low socio-economic background. The policy scheme allows me to implement a Sharp
Regression Discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of raising aspirations on
college attendance. The estimates reveal a significant impact of the policy on educational
aspirations and a consequent increase in the likelihood of staying on in full time education
after the compulsory school leaving age of 16, while no effect is observed on the probability
of eventually going to college. The analysis of the heterogeneous effects depending on
family income and pre-accumulated levels of cognitive skills allows me to shed some light
on the underlying mechanisms, bringing me to the conclusion that while instilling non
cognitive skills can increase the level of acquired human capital, partially substituting for
the lack of adequate cognitive skills, the presence of credit constraint eventually hampers
participation to higher education by pupils from low socio-economic background.
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1.1 Introduction
The post World War II decades have seen sharp increases in educational attainment and
access to college in most developed countries: in the US the share of youths going to
college rose from 10% in 1940 to 57% in 2012 (US Census Beaureau, 2013), while in the
UK participation to higher education took off from less than 5% in the ’50s to about 36%
in 2012 (HEFCE, 2010).
While a similar trend has been common to most OECD states (OECD, 2012), it var-
ied across countries in timing and intensity: in the UK, in particular, the acceleration
of enrollments to college took place from the late ’80s when a number of reforms to the
educational system were adopted in order to accelerate the pace of increase in educational
attainment.1
In most countries, however, the growth of the college student body was not uniform across
the population but rather concentrated among youths at the top of the income distri-
bution, as documented, among others, by Belley and Lochner (2007) and Deming and
Dynarski (2009) for the US and by Blanden and Machin (2004), Machin and Vignoles
(2004) and Lindley and Machin (2012) for the UK or Checchi et al. (1999) for Italy.2
The desire to increase the student body so as to bring in those generally left behind
has thus animated the action of policy makers around the world in the past fifty years:
in the US the Higher Education Act of 1965 introduced for the first time grants and low
interest loans for low and middle income college students, while European Governments
traditionally opted for a fully state funded higher education system for all students3 cou-
pled with the provision of small grants for the most disadvantaged ones.
1In particular in 1988 the UK Government reformed the system of age 16 examinations introducing
the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) which generally allowed more pupils to obtain
the qualifications required to enter Higher Education (Blanden et al., 2003); in 1990, then, the first UK
student loans system was introduced so as to promote access to college by pupils from less aﬄuent families;
finally, in 1992, the Further and Higher Education Act expanded significantly the number of institutions
which were granted university status, thus generating an increase in the number of students counted as
being in higher education (Wyness, 2010).
2Some recent studies, nevertheless, have documented a stabilization of the educational gap: for the UK,
Blanden and Machin (2008) show that the (small) increase in graduation rates that occurred between the
1970 and the 1975 cohorts was evenly distributed across family income groups, while for Italy Checchi et al.
(2013) document a decrease in inequality coupled, nevertheless, with an increased degree of polarization
in educational opportunities.
3England, for instance, introduced tuition fees for the first time in 1998, while in Sweden higher
education is still free of charge fro all Swedish and EU students.
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Still, neither the cut of tuition costs, nor the allocation of means-tested grants have proved
sufficient to eliminate the disparities in access to college. Kane (1995), for instance, re-
ported “no disproportionate growth in enrollment by low income youth” after the intro-
duction of the Pell Grant in the US in 1972;4 Dynarski (2000) analyzed the impact of
the 1993 Georgia HOPE program of scholarships for outstanding students and found that
it mostly benefited medium and high income students; while for the UK Dearden et al.
(2011) estimated that a £1,000 grant would currently increase the probability of going to
college by only 2.6 percentage points.
To what extent credit constraints are effectively responsible for these imbalances re-
mains an open question: Acemoglu and Pischke (2001), for instance, argue that in the
presence of imperfect credit markets “family income, rather than other factors related to
family background, explained 27 percentage points of the 36 percentage points difference
in college enrollment rates of children from the bottom and top quartiles in 1992 in the
US”5, on the other hand Heckman and Carneiro (2003) estimated that at most 8% of
the population may be prevented from going to college by short run credit constraints
and suggest that the gap in educational achievements would rather result from the scarce
accumulation of abilities that poorer children have experienced since they were born.
The recent economic literature has thus moved in both directions: on the one hand the
evaluation of policies that act on the financial barriers (Deming and Dynarski, 2009), on
the other hand the exploration of the role of accumulated cognitive and non cognitive
abilities (Heckman and Carneiro, 2003).
This paper takes the moves from the analysis of a recent British policy, Widening Par-
ticipation, that aims at raising the aspirations of youths from low socio-economic back-
ground in order to increase their participation to higher education. Indeed the British
governments of the 90s’ firmly believed that the lack of aspirations was a major barrier
to access to higher education and, more in general, to social mobility: in October 2007,
Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated that ”poverty of aspiration is what lies at the heart
of the failure of the British education system to be world beating [...] The great failure is
4Hansen (1983) as well had found no effect of the introduction of the grant on college enrollment.
5The major role of credit constraints as barrier to entry into higher education has also been stressed
by: Kane (1995), Card (1999), Card (2000), Kane (2001), Kane (2003).
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not the child who does not reach the stars, but the child who has no stars to reach for”
(Brown, 2007).
A similar political belief is supported by the findings of psychologists, who show that chil-
dren with higher aspirations put more effort in school and thus achieve higher outcomes
than children with lower ambitions (Gutman and Akerman, 2008). More in general, the
link between aspirations and achievements has been long emphasized in the sociological
literature (Biddle, 1979; Flynn and Lemay, 1999) as well as in psychology.
In economics then, the idea that the individual’s behavior is influenced by his aspirations,
has been borrowed from the psychological literature by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in
their formulation of the “prospect theory”. Yet, as Barberis (2013) recently described, the
empirical applications of this theory have been rare (with notable exceptions in the field
of finance), the best known example being the work of Camerer et al. (1997) on New York
taxi drivers’ target maximizing labor supply strategies.
More recent contributions have expanded the theory on reference points by formalizing
the way these are formed and deriving interesting implications in terms of growth and
“poverty traps” (Ray, 2004; Heifetz and Minelli, 2006; Mookherjee et al., 2010; Dalton
et al., 2011; Genicot and Ray, 2014).
In the analysis of schooling choices instead the recent economic literature moved more
in the direction of the works of Heckman considering aspirations and motivation towards
school as a particular type of non cognitive ability that affects the children’s learning skills
and that is still malleable in adolescent years (Heckman, 1999; Cunha and Heckman, 2007;
Cunha et al., 2010; Heckman et al., 2013) .
Identification of the impact of non cognitive abilities on educational outcomes and
schooling choices presents major challenges in that children who are less self-confident or
less motivated are also more likely to come from a disadvantaged socio-economic back-
ground and therefore simultaneously face both ability (cognitive and non cognitive) and
income constraints in accessing higher education.
Indeed recent empirical contributions which have tried to shed some light on the relation-
ship between aspirations and educational investments using experimental settings have
not succeeded in disentangling the effect of raising aspirations from that of relaxing credit
constraints (Chiapa et al., 2012; Wydick et al., 2013), or providing more information
(Nguyen, 2013), or improving cognitive skills (Hahn et al., 1994) or generally providing
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positive role models (Tierney et al., 2000).6 A convincing identification strategy would
need to rely on some exogenous source of variation of non cognitive abilities which should
not affect neither the subject’s economic conditions nor her cognitive abilities. Heckman
et al. (2013) move in this direction and exploit changes in personality traits experimentally
induced by the Perry Preschool program to analyze their impact on schooling outcomes
finding that the stimulation of personality traits, among which is “motivation towards
education”, during early childhood has sizable and significant impact on the individual’s
achievements until adulthood.
In this context the contribution of this paper is to provide clear and robust evidence on
the role of aspirations of adolescents on their educational outcomes. To do so, I exploit the
design of the Widening Participation policy which, by stimulating the pupils’ aspirations
without providing them with any form of financial aid nor academic tutoring, allows me
to overcome the endogeneity problem described above.
Moreover the present paper builds on the literature on non cognitive abilities by incorpo-
rating them in a model of schooling choice in which returns to education and success in
schooling depend on individual ability and the latter is a combination of cognitive abil-
ities, non cognitive abilities and parental background. The theoretical model allows me
to interpret my empirical results and shed some light on the relationship between ado-
lescents’ non cognitive abilities, their family social background and their schooling choices.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 1.2 introduces the WP policy, its political
background and its design; section 1.3 provides the theoretical framework to interpret the
empirical results; section 1.4 introduces the datasets that will be employed and provides
some descriptive statistics; section 1.5 describes the empirical strategy; section 1.6 is
dedicated to the results, section 1.7 to the robustness checks; and section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 The Widening Participation Policies
It is estimated that until the ’60s participation rates in post-compulsory (post-16) educa-
tion in the UK did not reach 20% of school leavers while by the end of the ’90s this rate
6Exploiting a particular experimental setting in Nicaragua Macours and Vakis (2009) provide some
more convincing evidence on the effects of raising aspirations on business investments.
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had almost reached 70% (Blanden and Machin, 2004). In the same way college attendance
expanded significantly: if in the ’50s no more than 5% of students were entering higher
education, today that is estimated to be around 36% (HEFCE, 2010).
Still, as mentioned in the introduction, such increase in participation has not been uniform
across the population but disproportionately favored those groups which were already over
represented in access to higher education: according to Blanden and Machin (2004), in
1981, the proportion of 23 year olds in the population holding a higher education degree
was 6% for families in the bottom income quintile and 20% for those in the top income
quintile, while by 1999 these proportions had risen to only 9% for the bottom income
quintile and to 46% for the top income quintile.7
On such premises the Kennedy (1997) and the Dearing (1997) reports, commissioned
by the government in preparation for a reform of the higher education system,8 set the
issue of “Widening Participation” to higher education at the center of the national politi-
cal agenda establishing that “participation should be widened rather than just increased”
(Kennedy, 1997) and that public funds should be distributed so as to reward “institutions
which can demonstrate a commitment to widening participation” (Dearing, 1997).
1.2.1 Policy Description
In response to the recommendations contained in the 1997 Government reports it was
established that the allocation mechanism of public funds to colleges would be revised
so as to reward those colleges which proved more successful in recruiting students from
disadvantaged backgrounds.
The government decided to distribute the funds for Widening Participation through the
7The same pattern has been documented in terms of mobility across social classes: in 1990 students
from social class 1-3(non manual) exhibited a rate of participation to higher education of 36.7%, while
those from social class 3(manual)-5 a rate of 10.3% (Robertson and Hillman, 1997); by 1997 both numbers
had increased substantially but the difference between the two had widened up, with a 49% participation
rate among students from social class 1-3(non manual) and a 18.4% among youths from lower social class
(Connor et al., 1999).
8Following the recommendations of the Dearing report, in 1998 the government introduced for the first
time up-front tuition fees to be paid by all UK and EU students (Wyness, 2010).
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Teaching Grant, which represents the main source of funding for colleges9 and which, until
1998/99 was simply proportional to the number of (full time equivalent) students enrolled.
From 1998/99 the formula for the allocation of the teaching grant was modified so that
students from “under-represented groups” would carry a larger weight. In 2007/08, for ex-
ample, a college recruiting exclusively students from the most disadvantaged areas would
receive more than 10% extra funds relative to one which would not recruit any student
from the target group (HEFCE, 2007).10 The amount of resources devoted to the initiative
has been substantial and rose from £78 million in 2002/03 to £307 million in 2004/2005
for an average number of target students of 222,000 per year.11
The public funds for WP distributed through the teaching grant are not held to specific
projects and activities to be carried out by the colleges, but these remain free to design
and implement their own widening participation agenda on which they have to report each
year to the Government.
The type of activities carried out by Higher Education Institutions to recruit students
from low participation neighborhoods typically range from visits to colleges, to summer
schools, mentoring and tutoring activities and also meetings with parents to involve them
in the decision and raise their awareness.12 Figure 1.3 shows the WP initiatives that col-
leges carry out more often as of a recent survey among colleges WP administrators (Bowes
et al., 2013).
On top of receiving public funds as a reward to the results obtained through their
outreach activities, colleges typically manage to attract further funds from private donors
to sponsor their widening participation activities.
9Following the definition adopted by HEFCE, in this work I generically refer to “colleges” or “Higher
Education Institutions” to indicate Universities, Higher Education Colleges and Further Education Col-
leges; the latter provide mainly vocational curricula and are similar to the US Community Colleges.
10A secondary source of funding of the WP policies are the ”Special Initiative Funds” allocated to
colleges to finance specific projects aimed at increasing the participation into Higher Education of pupils
from under-represented groups. This type of funding, nevertheless, remained marginal, accounting for
about only 8% of the total public funding for WP in 2006/07.
11Data on the amount of funds are taken from the HEFCE yearly publication “Recurrent Grants for
...: Revised Allocations”; while the number of students is calculated as the average yearly size (for 1994
to 2000) of the 18 year old cohort in the target areas from the figures in HEFCE (2005).
12These activities are not meant to provide a better academic preparation to the pupils not better
information about how to et into college (like the interventions analyzed by Bettinger et al. (2009) or
Oreopoulos and Dunn (2012) but rather to give pipils a “taster” experience of college, see for example:
http://www.london.ac.uk/tasters.
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Indeed Higher Education Institutions generally make their commitment to widening par-
ticipation a point of pride and this is recognized by a number of highly advertised awards
such as the “London Education Partnership Awards”.13
Finally, the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) publishes every year detailed
data on the intake of students from under-represented groups by each Higher Education
Institution in England14 thus creating an effective and transparent mechanism of public
monitoring.
1.2.2 Eligibility
From 2004/2005 the English government has used a specifically designed classification sys-
tem called POLAR (Participation Of Local Areas)15 to identify which students qualified
as belonging to an under-represented group and should thus be targeted by WP activities.
This system is based on the youth participation rate to Higher Education in the 2001
Census wards;16 for each ward a local youth participation rate was computed referring to
the students who were aged 18-21 in 1997-1999 (HEFCE, 2010); wards were then ranked
according to this rate and defined eligible for WP activities if their youth participation
rate fell in the two lowest quintiles of the distribution. The POLAR system induced a lot
of geographical heterogeneity in the distribution of WP funds within England, figure 1.1,
for example, shows the target areas in London, distinguishing those falling in the lowest
quintile from those falling in the second one.
13The London Education Partnership Awards recognize and build on a well-established tradition among
London’s education providers in offering higher education opportunities to a wide range of learners raising
the aspirations of young people to help them achieve their full potential. www.lepawards.org.uk
14www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2060&Itemid=141
15The first system used by HEFCE was a commercial product called “Super Profiles” which identified
160 clusters of neighborhoods but is not currently available to the public. The POLAR system adopted in
2004 has then been progressively improved and updated: POLAR2 has been released in 2008 and POLAR3
in 2012.
16England counts 8850 of them with an average adult population size of 4250 people per ward.
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Figure 1.1: London Target Areas. 2001 Census wards, by youth participation rate. HEFCE.
1.3 Theoretical Framework
1.3.1 Setup
The idea that a raise in aspirations would generate an increase in the level of schooling may
be translated in an economic model where returns to education and success in schooling
depend on individual ability and this incorporates a non cognitive component (motivation,
aspirations).
I shall consider a standard two-period model as in Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012)
where individuals invest in schooling in the first period (youth) and work in the second
(adulthood). Preferences are time separable and represented by:
U = u(c0) + β u(c1) (1.1)
where ct is consumption in periods t ∈ {0, 1}, β > 0 is a discount factor, and u(·) is strictly
increasing and concave and satisfies standard Inada conditions.
In this model each individual is endowed in period 0 with a certain level of family
income y0 and ability a; during youth individuals choose how much time (effort) to spend
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in school, h, rather than working;17 time in school entails both a direct cost τ > 0 (e.g.
tuition fees) and an opportunity cost w0 ≥ 0 given by the wage rate for a young unskilled
worker, while it increases adult labor income y1. Indeed I shall assume that the market
pays a price w1 for accumulated human capital s and that ability increases the returns
to education so that y1 = w1 a s. Finally, I assume that the level of accumulated human
capital depends (positively) on time in school h and ability a and that the two inputs
present a positive degree of complementarity, i.e. s = f(h, a), where f(·) is positive,
strictly increasing and concave in both arguments, and ∂
2f
∂h∂a > 0.
While young individuals will borrow (or save) an amount d which they will repay
when they are adults at a gross interest rate R. Consumption levels in the two periods
will therefore be:
c0 = y0 + w0(1− h)− τh+ d
c1 = w1 a f(h, a)−Rd
(1.2)
To complete the model, I eventually assume that ability a is a function of the current
levels of cognitive and non cognitive skills (respectively θc and θn) and parental environ-
ment, which I shall again proxy for with parental income y0; I model this function as a
CES where the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution s will be an empirical question.
a =
[
acθ
s−1
s
c + anθ
s−1
s
n + a0y
s−1
s
0
] s
s−1
(1.3)
The ability production function chosen here recalls the formulation introduced by Cunha
and Heckman (2007) as it includes parental environment as an input for skills formation
but differs from it significantly in that it disregards the dynamic process of skill accumula-
tion allowing individuals to invest in human capital only in one period, generically labeled
as youth. Indeed while Cunha and Heckman (2007) focus on the time complementari-
ties between investments in early childhood and later on, this model rather looks at the
complementarities between cognitive and non cognitive skills to explain the effects of an
exogenous shift in only one of these two components.
17The model abstracts from decisions on leisure.
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1.3.2 Solution and Predictions in the case of perfect credit markets
If we assume that there are perfect credit markets then individuals will be free to borrow
(or save) any amount d while young as long as they manage to repay it during adulthood at
the gross interest rate R. Individuals thus maximize utility in equation (1.1) with respect
to both h and d subject to the conditions (1.2). The resulting optimality condition for
investment in human capital h will be:
w1 a f
′(h∗, a)
w0 + τ
= R (1.4)
This condition states that the individual chooses investment in human capital so as to
maximize the present value of net lifetime income, equating the net marginal return to
schooling (on the left hand side) to the return to the financial asset R.18
At the same time, d∗ will be chosen so as to smooth consumption and satisfy a standard
Euler Equation:
u′(y0 + w0(1− h)− τh+ d∗) = β R u′(w1 a f(h, a)−Rd∗) (1.5)
In this setting the impact of a raise in the non cognitive trait which I labeled as
“aspirations” on the attained level of schooling will be given by:
∂s∗
∂θn
≡ ∂f(h
∗, a)
∂θn
where f(h∗, a) is the level of schooling attained when choosing the optimal level of invest-
ment in human capital h∗.
Applying a simple chain rule we obtain that:
∂f(h∗, a)
∂θn
≡ ∂f
∗
∂θn
= f ′h
∂h∗
∂θn
+ f ′a
∂a
∂θn
=
= f ′h
∂h∗
∂a
∂a
∂θn
+ f ′a
∂a
∂θn
=
=
∂a
∂θn
[
f ′h
∂h∗
∂a
+ f ′a
]
≥ 0
(1.6)
The sign of this term will be positive because f(·) is strictly increasing in both h and a
(f ′h > 0, f
′
a > 0),
∂a
∂θn
can be null or positive depending on the elasticity of substitution
18Notice that in this case the optimal level of investment in human capital, h∗ depends on parental
income y0 only “indirectly” through the effect of the latter on ability.
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of the ability production function and ∂h
∗
∂a is positive if we allow for complementarities
between effort and ability in the production of human capital ( ∂
2f
∂h∂a > 0). Indeed, call:
F ≡ w1 a f
′(h, a)
w0 + τ
−R
applying the implicit function theorem:
∂h∗
∂a
= − ∂F/∂a
∂F/∂h∗
=
1
af
′
h + f
′′
ha
−f ′′hh
> 0 (1.7)
where both terms in the numerator are positive, while f ′′hh < 0 by concavity of f(·).
In conclusion I obtain that:
∂f∗
∂θn
=
∂a
∂θn
[
f ′h
1
af
′
h + f
′′
ha
−f ′′hh
+ f ′a
]
≥ 0 (1.8)
As all the terms inside the brackets are positive, the final direction of the effect will
depend only on the sign of the first term ∂a∂θn so that, in the case in which there are no
credit constraints, estimating ∂f
∗
∂θn
would allow me to infer the elasticity of substitution
between the inputs in the ability production function. In particular, in the case of:
• Substitutable Inputs:
s > 0 ⇔ ∂a
∂θn
> 0 ⇔ ∂f
∗
∂θn
> 0
• Leontief production function:
s→ 0 ⇔ ∂a
∂θn
=
{
an anθn ≤ min {acθc, a0y0}
0 otherwise
⇔ ∂f
∗
∂θn
{
> 0 anθn ≤ min {acθc, a0y0}
= 0 otherwise
The effect of an exogenous raise in non cognitive abilities will generate an increase in hu-
man capital for any positive value of s, while the only case in which a similar intervention
may not have any effect is that in which the inputs of the ability production function
(cognitive and non cognitive skills, and parental environment) are perfect complements to
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each other; in this case the intervention will only generate a positive effect among those
who already have higher cognitive skills and a more favorable parental environment.
The model in this section further relies on the assumption that an exogenous shift in
non cognitive abilities will not affect the level of cognitive abilities, i.e. that there are no
cross-productivity effects of non cognitive skills on cognitive skills. Cunha and Heckman
(2010) claim that such effects exist and are quite significant but also show that they fade
out as children get older, so that when the child is 12-13 years old the cross-productivity
effect is essentially null.
1.3.3 Solution and Predictions in the case of binding credit constraints
I extend the model just introduced by relaxing the assumption made above that individuals
can borrow any amount d∗ when they are young as long as they manage to pay it back once
adults. Suppose therefore that some individuals cannot borrow as much as they would
like, i.e. there is a maximum level of borrowing which is allowed d¯ and for a fraction of the
population d¯ < d∗. As d∗ is decreasing in family income y0 (from equation 1.5) it turns
out that it is the poorest individuals who are credit constrained. In the case of binding
credit constraints individuals will just choose how much time to invest in education h,
while they will borrow the maximum available amount d¯; the only first order condition is
thus:
−u′(y0 + w0 (1− h∗)− τ h∗ + d¯) + βu′(w1 a f(h∗, a)−Rd¯) w1 a f ′h = 0 (1.9)
As in the case of perfect credit markets, the effect of an exogenous increase in the level of
non cognitive abilities will be given by:
∂f∗
∂θn
=
∂a
∂θn
[
f ′h
∂h∗
∂a
+ f ′a
]
(1.10)
where one needs to determine the sign of the term ∂h
∗
∂θn
. To do so, I shall again use the
implicit function theorem and define the term on the left handside of equation 1.9 as F ,
so that:
∂h∗
∂a
= − ∂F/∂a
∂F/∂h∗
< 0
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It turns out that the sign of the term ∂h
∗
∂a is now negative (see Appendix 1.10.1 for proof),
i.e. an increase in the level of ability generates a decrease in the amount of time pupils
invest in education. The rationale for this finding is that because individuals are not
able to smooth consumption as they would like to, when they become “more efficient”
in learning, i.e. they can accumulate as much human capital as before even with less
investment in education (because f ′a > 0 and f ′′ha > 0), they prefer to reduce the amount
of time invested in human capital accumulation and work more during youth to increase
their level of consumption at period 0.
The final sign of the term in brackets in equation 1.10 may still be positive if:
−∂h
∗
∂a
<
f ′a
f ′h
(1.11)
in which case the magnitude of the (negative) effect described above is smaller than that
of the relative marginal productivity of ability with respect to that of time in the pro-
duction of human capital, i.e. the higher the marginal productivity of ability relative to
that of time, the more likely that the individual will still end up with a higher level of
accumulated human capital even if he is investing less time in it.
In summary, the model described predicts heterogeneous effects of an exogenous in-
crease in the level of non cognitive skills on the level of accumulated human capital de-
pending on the level of cognitive skills and family income. Such effects will be furthermore
different in the cases in which the economy exhibits perfect or imperfect credit markets
and the inputs in the ability production function are substitutable or not (see appendix
1.10.2 for a schematic summary). In particular:
1. s>0 and perfect credit markets:
∂f∗
∂θn
> 0 for all individuals, irrespectively of their family income y0 and of their
cognitive skills θc;
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2. s>0 and imperfect credit markets:
∂f∗
∂θn
> 0 for individuals with high family income y0 (not credit constrained),
irrespectively of their cognitive skills θc;
∂f∗
∂θn
≷ 0 for individuals with low family income y0 (credit constrained),
irrespectively of their cognitive skills θc;
3. s=0 and perfect credit markets:
∂f∗
∂θn
> 0 for individuals with high cognitive skills θc and high family income y0;
∂f∗
∂θn
= 0 for individuals with low cognitive skills θc and/or low family income y0;
4. s=0 and imperfect credit markets:
∂f∗
∂θn
> 0 for individuals with high cognitive skills θc and high family income y0;
∂f∗
∂θn
= 0 for individuals with low cognitive skills θc or low y0;
The analysis of heterogeneity in the effects of raising aspirations along the two dimen-
sions of family income and cognitive skills can help to pin down which of these four cases
best describes the reality of the UK higher education system.
1.4 Data and descriptive statistics
This paper exploits a wide range of data to test the impact of the WP initiatives, com-
bining information about the supply side, in particular the funding received by the higher
education institutions and their activities aimed at recruiting students from low socio
economic background, with information about the demand side, such as students’ family
background and schooling decisions.
The first batch of data comes from HEFCE and provides the youth participation rate for
the 1997-1999 cohorts (YPR) and the POLAR partition of the 2001 Census wards com-
puted accordingly.19
19The YPR computed by HEFCE ranges from 7.8% to 145%, with a mean value of 35%, slightly above
the actual national average.
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The HEFCE data are then merged with a number of individual datasets on the basis
of the 2001 Census ward where the individual lives.20 The first individual dataset used
is the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS21). This contains a large sample of UK
households with detailed information on the household’s composition, activities and as-
sets.
I build a sample of individuals who have been in secondary school for at least one year
during the WP POLAR system; these are those who reached college entry age from 2005
on (born later than august 1986) and were older than 18 at the time of survey. For these
students I create an indicator variable for whether they stayed on in full time education
after the compulsory school leaving age of 16 and another indicator for whether they fur-
ther went to college at age 18.
Table 1.1 shows that the proportion of students who stayed on in full time education
after 16 is around 68%, while the share of those getting into college around 34%. These
numbers are in line with the Government official figures which estimate that, for example
in 2006/2007, 64.9% of 17 year old youths were in full time education (Department for
Education and Office for National Statistics, 2010), while 31.7% of students aged between
17 and 20 were in college (Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and Office for
National Statistics, 2013).22
Table 1.1 also contains descriptive statistics for a number of individual and household’s
characteristics including ethnicity, household’s location and parental income and educa-
tion. Clearly, as highlighted in column (4) WP eligible students come from poorer and
less educated households. Moreover the statistics indicate that they mainly come from
urban settings but not from London.23
A second source of data is then the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England
(LSYPE24), a panel dataset managed by the Department for Education (DfE), which fol-
20The information about the household’s postcode has been accessed through the Secure Data Service,
UK Data Archive, University of Essex.
21Office for National Statistics (2012)
22This number raises to 35.9% if one looks at the 17-30 age group while it is about 33% in the estimates
of HEFCE (2010)
23HEFCE (2005), among others, documents that participation to higher education is lowest in the cities
of the North East region, Durham, New Castle upon Tyne and Sunderland.
24Department for Education and National Centre for Social Research (2012)
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lows a (sample of a) cohort of pupils from the age of 13 until 20 (as of 2013). Despite
being smaller than the QLFS and covering a single cohort of students, the LSYPE brings
a number of advantages to the researcher in that it contains very detailed information
about the pupils’ family background, their schooling achievements, including grades, and,
most importantly, their attitudes and aspirations. These are captured by some questions
about the child’s plans for the future; in this paper I exploit the answers to a question
that asks them to state how likely they feel they will go to college. The variable is coded
on a 4 points scale (“not at all likely”, “not very likely”, “fairly likely” and “very likely”)
with a mean value of 2.88 (Table 1.1).
While all the main socio economic characteristics of the sampled households are in line
with those of the QLFS, it is further interesting to notice the large gap in aspirations
between eligible and non eligible pupils.
The LSYPE finally allows me to track progression in education of pupils at age 16 and
18 as the QLFS does, thus providing scope for a test of robustness of the results obtained
with the QLFS.
As for the QLFS, the LSYPE is merged with the HEFCE data through the home address
of the child’s family linking each household to the corresponding Census ward and hence
youth participation rate and eligibility status.
The last source of data I employ is the National Pupil Database (NPD25) that I use
to test whether the policy had any impact on pupils achievements at Key Stage 5 (age
18).26 The advantage of the NPD is that it covers the full population27 thus giving us very
robust results. On the other hand, these data do not contain any background information
about the pupils’ household but only a detailed record of their educational achievements.
Some descriptive statistics from the NPD sample employed are reported in table 1.2. Once
again they confirm that targeted students are poorer (there is indeed a higher share among
them of free school meal eligible children) and obtain lower grades throughout all their
school career.
25Department for Education (2012)
26These are equivalent to the US High School GPAs
27I have the data related to the cohort born in 1989/1990, the same from which a sample has been
followed in the LSYPE.
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1.5 Empirical Strategy
1.5.1 Identification
Aim of this paper is to estimate the effect of a “raise in aspirations” on a child’s probability
of eventually going to college. Consider indeed the following reduced form econometric
specification:
Sit+1 = α+ β Aict + ict (1.12)
where Sict+1 is a binary variable indicating whether child i, living in the census ward c,
goes to college after leaving compulsory school (at t + 1); Aict is the child’s aspirations
when he is still at school, measured as his stated likelihood of going to college; and ict
is a stochastic error term representing all the observable and unobservable individual
characteristics which affect the schooling choice Sict+1. The coefficient β is the “structural”
parameter of interest, i.e. ∂f
∗
∂θn
.
Clearly Aict and ict are likely to be correlated, as for example one would expect children
with more highly educated parents to have both higher aspirations and better financial
means to face the cost of college. To overcome this endogeneity problem I exploit the
variation in aspirations generated by exposure to the WP policy interventions; let WPct
be an indicator function for whether the census ward c where the child lives is a WP target
area, I can obtain a system of simultaneous equations of the type:
Sict+1 = α+ β Aict + ict
Aict = a+ b WPct + uict
(1.13)
where the two error terms, it and uit, are still correlated because exposure to treatment
is not random. I exploit the fact that the assignment rule of individuals to WP policy
interventions is known exactly to solve this problem. The deterministic function that
assigns children to the group of the WP target students is:
WPct =
{
1 if Y PRc ≤ Q2
0 otherwise
(1.14)
where Y PRc is the Youth Participation Rate to Higher Education described in section
1.2.2 and Q2 denotes the upper bound of the second quintile of its distribution. Children
therefore are targeted if they reside in areas where the participation rate to higher educa-
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tion of older cohorts is below the 40th percentile.
Knowledge of this assignment rule allows me to use a (Sharp) Regression Discontinuity
Design as introduced by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) and more recently largely
employed in education economics (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 2000; Lavy, 2009).
The running variable determining assignment to treatment will be the measure of youth
participation rate of the ward where the child lives Y PRc.
The heart of this design is to examine whether discontinuities in the WP funding at the
predetermined cutoff point are mirrored by discontinuities in the outcome variables.
My estimating equations will be:
Sict+1 = f(Y PRc) + γ WPct + υict
Aict = g(Y PRc) + c WPct + uict
(1.15)
where f(·) and g(·) are unknown functions of the forcing variable Y PRc whose form will
be discussed in section 1.5.2. Estimation of the conditional expectations of the outcome
variables on the two sides of the cutoff Q2 will return an unbiased estimate of the two
reduced form parameters γ and c. The relationship between the estimated and the struc-
tural parameters is obtained by combining the two equations in 1.13. Estimation of 1.15
will thus return:
γˆ =̂(β × b)SRP = lim
Y PRc→Q+2
E (Sict+1|Y PRc = yprc)− lim
Y PRc→Q−2
E (Sict+1|Y PRc = yprc)
cˆ = bˆSRP = lim
Y PRc→Q+2
E (Aict|Y PRc = yprc)− lim
Y PRc→Q−2
E (Aict|Y PRc = yprc)
(1.16)
The empirical design just described allows me to retrieve an unbiased estimate of the
structural parameter of interest βˆ = γˆcˆ =
(̂β×b)SRP
bˆSRP
at the point of discontinuity (i.e. for
those students who live in a neighbourhood where the Youth Participation Rate to higher
education is close enough to the 40th percentile) and to assess the effectiveness of the WP
policy interventions in raising the aspirations of the youths (bˆ).
The estimates obtained, nevertheless, will need to be interpreted as a Local Intention
To Treat (ITT) effect. Indeed while we have exact information on the criteria which rule
the assignment to WP treatment, we know little about the actual treatment “subminis-
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tration”. Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest the existence of heterogeneity in the way
Higher Education Institutions choose their target students: some colleges stick to the
HEFCE POLAR criterion, while others just target the schools in the poorest neighbor-
hoods nearby. Such imperfect compliance does not allow the researcher to estimate the
actual effect of the treatment, but only that of the assignment to treatment, which can
give particularly precious information to policy makers on the effectiveness of the policy
design.28
1.5.2 Estimation
The intuition behind a SRD is that comparing the pool of individuals in a small enough
neighborhood of the discontinuity is similar to a randomized experiment at the cutoff point
because individuals below and above the cutoff point have essentially the same value of
Youth Participation Rate.
In this paper I report estimates of c and γ based on both parametric and non parametric
specifications of the conditional mean of the outcomes. As for the parametric specifica-
tion, the use of a simple linear approximation on Y PRc, even allowing for the slope to
be different on the two sides, will require to trim the data to a narrow enough window
around the cutoff Q2 such that a linear regression can well approximate the relationship
between the two variables. Conversely, increasing the order of polynomial allows for a
more flexible specification and thus for the use of a larger window. In the tables I present
results for linear, quadratic and cubic specifications allowing the slope and the concavity of
the function to change independently on each side of the cutoff. When using a first order
polynomial I only use observations within 10 percentage points from the cutoff, whereas
I use a 20 percentage points window for the quadratic specification and a 30 percentage
points window for the third order polynomial.
My preferred estimates are instead those based on a non parametric specification,
which allows me to relax most of the assumptions required by the parametric models. I
follow Hahn et al. (2001) and employ a non parametric local linear regression (LLR) to
28The Intention To Treat parameter will approach the actual Treatment Effect as the rate of compliance
increases. Bowes et al. (2013) report that the POLAR classification is used by more than 80% of the
surveyed colleges. Yet, most colleges use also other criteria to identify the WP target students (for example
they choose to target children from state schools).
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approximate the functions f(·) and g(·) as the forcing variable approaches the cutoff point;
as for the parametric case, the difference between the two functions at the cutoff point
will provide the estimate of the treatment effect.
The LLR on the two sides of the cutoff is estimated using Triangular Kernel weights so
that observations which are closer to the cutoff point will carry a larger weight: Fan and
Gijbels (1996) proved that Triangular Kernel weighted local linear regression performs
optimally at the window boundary and thus also at the cutoff where the SRD requires
most precision.
The only choice required in the LLR estimation remains that of the bandwidth: a larger
bandwidth would improve the precision of the estimates (lower variance) but return more
biased estimates of the treatment effect. In this paper I will use the optimal bandwidth
derived by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010) through a plug in method which minimizes
the Expected Squared Error Loss around the cutoff point. Moreover, for robustness,
results are always showed for a bandwidth equal to half and twice the optimal one too,
while graphical analysis is used to explore the sensitivity of the estimated coefficient to
the bandwidth chosen.
Finally, as the policy varies at the census ward level, I cluster standard errors at this level
allowing for the possibility that these may be correlated among individuals living in the
same ward.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Aspirations
I first proceed with the estimation of the parameter c as in equation 1.15.b and I use,
as a measure of aspirations, the stated likelihood of applying to college. As explained in
section 3.3, in each wave of the LSYPE, youths are asked to state how likely they are
of applying to university and they are given four options: “very likely”, “fairly likely”,
“not very likely” and “not at all likely”. This question is asked to the pupils every year
until they reach age 18 and their answers show a good variability over time, getting more
polarized as they grow older (figure 1.2).
In order to estimate the structural parameter of interest (b), I reshape this “aspirations”
variable as a dichotomous one, giving it value one if the pupil states she is either very or
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Figure 1.2: Likelihood of applying to university at age 18. LSYPE waves 1-5.
fairly likely to apply and 0 if she says she is not very or not at all likely to apply and I
pool observations over time for the same individual.29
Figure 1.4 shows the jump at the discontinuity in the probability of stating to be likely
to apply to university of about 4.5 percentage points over a baseline probability of 52.7%.
If aspiartions automatically translated into effective choices the magnitude of this effect
would be very large: comparing it to the estimates of Dearden et al. (2009), a similar
increase in the probability of enrollment would be equivalent to that generated by a grant
of over 1,700 £.
Table 1.3 reports the detailed results, these are robust to functional form specification
(order of polynomial and non parametric specification) and magnitude of the bandwidth.
Indeed the results reported in table 1.3 employ an optimal bandwidth computed as in
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010) together with its half and its double, and figure 1.5
shows the sensitivity of the result to the choice of the bandwidth, revealing how a small
bandwidth returns more imprecise yet possibly less biased estimates.
1.6.2 Drop out at 16
I estimate the effect of aspirations on actual schooling choices both at 16, when students
only have to decide whether to drop out of school or stay on in full time education and
prepare to get into college, and at age 18 when they actually enroll to college.30
29The results are qualitatively similar but less precise if I estimate the treatment effect year by year.
30After 16, having passed the GCSE examinations, students can stay in education and obtain the A-
levels which will allow them to get into university, obtain a degree of further education, or drop out of full
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The advantage of looking at the choices made by students when they are 16 is that there
are no barriers for them to stay in education at that time: education is still free and they
do not need gain admission as they do for college, the UK Higher Education system being
highly selective.
I thus estimate a version of equation 1.15.a in which the outcome is a binary variable
that equals one if the student stays on in full time education after age 16 and 0 if he drops
out. Such indicator is built from both the QLFS data and the LSYPE and presents a
similar distribution in the two datasets (table 1.1).
The estimate of the effect of the WP policies obtained through regression discontinuity
reveals a positive significant increase in the probability of staying on in education after
age 16; as shown in the two panels of figure 1.6 this jump is slightly lower in the QLFS
sample than in the LSYPE one, table 1.4 confirming that the effect amounts to 3.2 per-
centage points in the QLFS and 4.5 percentage points in the LSYPE, from a baseline of
respectively 68.6% and 64.1% and is robust to the various specification checks (different
functional form specifiactions and choice of bandwidth).
Following equation 1.16.a, I retrieve an estimate of the structural parameter β by
dividing these numbers by the estimated increase in aspirations (as from section 1.6.1).
This allows me to conclude that a 10 percentage points increase in aspirations (in terms of
stated likelihood of going to college) would translate into a 7.2 percentage points increase
in the likelihood of staying on in full time education after the compulsory school leaving
age of 16. This means that three out of four pupils who want to apply to college decide
to stay on in education after 16 so as to effectively get to college. Such a high proportion
suggests that modifying aspirations can indeed be a very powerful measure to increase
higher education participation.
1.6.3 Higher Education Participation
The final outcome of interest, the target of the WP policies, is then participation to full
time college. I use again both the data from the QLFS and those from the LSYPE to
estimate the effect of the policy on the probability of enrolling to university (γˆ =̂(β × b)).
time education.
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As shown in figure 1.8, the jump generated by the policy is not anymore statistically sig-
nificant, neither with the QLFS nor with the LSYPE data. Such jump is estimated to be
around 0.6 to 1.5 percentage points on both datasets (respectively from a baseline of 39%
and 36.6%). This translates into a non significant 1.3 to 3.4 percentage points increase in
the probability of going to college for an increase of 10 percentage points in aspirations
(equation 1.16.b).
This finding casts a shadow on the efficacy of the WP policies: it shows that increased
aspirations may well translate into a lower rate of drop out at age 16, but do not auto-
matically generate an increase in college attendance. It is therefore reasonable to expect
there to be other factors hampering the participation to higher education of pupils from
low socio economic background.
1.6.4 Analysis of heterogeneous effects
As predicted by the model in section 3.2, the final effect of a raise in aspirations on the
accumulated level of human capital depends on the individual’s level of accumulated cog-
nitive skills and on his family background. The analysis of heterogeneity along these two
lines in the effects of a raise in aspirations allows us to shed some light on the mechanisms
that underlie the final average effect described above.
In order to distinguish among the four cases described in section 3.2, I first look at the
distribution of the effects depending on parental income. Splitting the sample in income
quantiles, I find that the increase in aspirations and continuation rates at age 16 is concen-
trated among pupils belonging to middle income families (those in the second and third
quintiles of the parental income distribution,31) whereas participation to higher education
at age 18 significantly increases only for those pupils who belong to high income families
(6 percentage points more likely to enroll to university from a baseline of 33.2% in the
QLFS and 15 percentage points from a baseline of 37.9% in the LSYPE).
This result allows us to exclude the possibility that the economy exhibits perfect credit
markets and inputs in the production function of ability are substitutable (case 1 in the
list described n section 3.2). On the other hand, the result by which a raise in aspirations
generates a positive effect only on those with high income remains compatible with the
31The distribution of parental income in the LSYPE cannot be split in more than for quantiles because
income is top coded and the highest bin contains about a quarter of the population.
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other three options: that inputs are substitutable and some individuals are credit con-
strained, that inputs are not substitutable and everyone has access to credit, that inputs
are substitutable and not everyone has access to credit. The analysis of heterogeneity in
the effects depending on pre-accumulated cognitive skills and on the interaction between
these and parental income can allow me to distinguish among these cases.
The LSYPE contains information on the history of the pupils’ school achievements
taken from the administrative data of the National Pupil database (NPD). In order to
assess whether the policy had a differential impact depending on the level of cognitive
skills, I split the sample according to their average score at Key Stage 2 tests. These tests
are taken by all English pupils when they are 11, at the end of grade 6 (junior school).
The results in table 1.7 reveal that there is no clear pattern in the effect of the policy
on neither aspirations nor school participation and reject the hypothesis that the effect
is positive only for those with high cognitive skills. This finding rules out the possibility
that cognitive skills are perfect complements to non cognitive skills and that there are no
credit constraints (case 3 of section 3.2).
A final exercise I perform consists in pooling together the income and the ability dis-
tributions by splitting the sample in four groups (table 1.8): the first group is formed of
individuals who fall in the two lowest quartiles of both the income and the ability dis-
tribution (Q1/Q2-P1/P2); the second of those who fall in the two lowest quartiles of the
income distribution but whose KS2 scores were above the median (Q1/Q2-P3/P4); the
third group are those whose parental income is above the median but whose KS2 scores
below (Q3/Q4-P1/P2); and the last group is formed of those who fall in the two top quar-
tiles of both the income and the ability distributions.
Having rejected the case that there are no credit constraints, I want to understand whether
the fact that I find a positive final effect only on pupils coming from the most aﬄuent
families is only due to the fact that only them can borrow as much as they like or is further
caused by the existence of a positive degree of substitutability between inputs in the abil-
ity production function (case 2 or 4 in section 3.2). Indeed if inputs were substitutable,
the effect would be positive on both high and low ability students coming from well off
families because the increase in non cognitive skills would more than compensate for the
gap in cognitive skills; if instead inputs were perfect complements, the effect on those who
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come from more aﬄuent families but have low cognitive skills would be null.
The results in table 1.8 show that indeed among those whose parents have high income
(Q3-Q4) there is no difference in the effects of the policy between those with high (P3-P4)
and those with low (P1-P2) cognitive skills (columns 3 and 4) so that one would point at
the existence of a positive degree of substitutability between cognitive and non cognitive
skills in the production of ability and rule out the possibility that the difference in the
effects of the policy between high and low income families is (partly) due to the fact that
a raise in only one of the inputs of the ability production function (non cognitive skills)
would have no effect on the resulting level of ability if children have low levels of either of
the two other inputs, i.e. cognitive skills and family income.
1.6.5 Evidence on cross-productivity effects
The model described in section 3.2 is based on the assumption that an exogenous increase
in non cognitive skills does not per se generate an increase in cognitive skills too. This
is what Cunha et al. (2010) define “cross productivity effects” providing evidence that
these are quite significant at early ages (6-7 to 8-9 year old) and decreases significantly
later on so that at ages 10-11 to 12-13 the estimated cross productivity effect between non
cognitive and cognitive skills is essentially null.
I investigate the presence and magnitude of cross productivity effects among the WP
target pupils through the analysis of the NPD data; I use two measures of cognitive skills
at age 18: the first is the number of A-level equivalent examinations taken, these are the
academic qualifications obtained at the end of the thirteenth grade (at age 18) and their
results are the main criterion for admission to college, students can decide how many and
which A-level subjects to study and be examined on, most of them choose to sit three to
four examinations. The second measure is instead the total point score the students obtain
at grade 13, which gives a measure of their performance at the A-level examinations.
Estimating the treatment effect on pupils’ achievements, I find that the policy did neither
affect the number of A-levels obtained nor the total point score obtained by students at age
18 confirming that the possible cross productivity effects do not appear in late adolescence
as suggested by Cunha and Heckman (2010). The results are illustrated in figures 1.10
and 1.11 and detailed in table 1.9.
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1.7 Specification checks
In order for the Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design to yield consistent estimates we
require the counter factual conditional distribution of the outcome variable to be smooth
in the covariate Y PR, i.e. that the probability of enrolling into higher education, in the
absence of the policy, is “continuously” related to the youth participation rate of the cen-
sus ward of residence.
While this assumption cannot be tested directly, it is common practice to assess its fea-
sibility by checking that other variables which are usually associated to the outcome of
interest do not also vary discontinuously at the threshold (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).
Figures 1.12 and 1.13 show that both mother’s education and parental income do not ex-
hibit any suspicious discontinuity at the cutoff point for both the QLFS and the LSYPE
samples. Moreover analytic estimates of the discontinuities for these and several other
variables are reported in table 1.10 and are indeed not significantly different from zero.
I finally run two falsification tests and reestimate all the main results at a “false” cut
off point for the LSYPE sample and for an “older” cohort for the QLFS sample.
For the LSYPE, where only one cohort of pupils is surveyed, I “move” the cut off point
“up” by 10 percentage points and check that there are no significant discontinuities there.
The results, in table 1.11 , show no “effect” on any of the variables of interest.
The QLFS instead, with its household structure and its longer history, allows me to
estimate the “effects” on a sample of individuals who reside in the same target areas but
are too old to be themselves exposed to any WP initiative in that they finished secondary
school between 1996/97 and 2000/2001.
The estimates reported in table 1.12 confirm that there was no effect of the WP policies
on older cohorts and thus the discontinuities identified are not due to some unobserved
feature of the population but only to the policy intervention.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to the literature on human capital accumulation and, in particular,
on the role of non cognitive abilities in shaping children’s future providing a clear iden-
tification of the actual impact on educational achievements of a policy intervention that
exogenously improves non cognitive abilities without affecting neither cognitive abilities
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nor financial constraints.
The results revealed that students from low socio economic background do have lower
aspirations and that this does hamper their chances of going to college. Indeed the activi-
ties carried out through Widening Participation significantly raised their motivation to go
to college and consequently kept them in full time education after the compulsory school
leaving age of 16.
Yet, the final effect on college attendance was modest. I showed that this is due to the
existence of binding credit constraints rather than to the presence of strong complemen-
tarities between the inputs in the ability production function. Moreover the fact that the
gap in test scores at age 18 between low and high SES students is not affected by the
policy intervention proves that there are no cross-productivity effects in the production of
ability of teenagers.
The results of this paper naturally have limited external validity because of the esti-
mation strategy employed which does give very precise estimates, but only of a local effect
(on individuals around the discontinuity point).
Still this paper provides very meaningful and new insights on the mechanisms which rule
individuals’ schooling choices being the first to test the impact of a nation wide program
that aims at increasing education by acting uniquely on pupils’ non cognitive traits, such
as aspirations and motivation. The inclusion of these elements in a model of schooling
choice seems to have been too long neglected by economists in contrast with the primary
role that politicians have been assigning to them. The significant effects found in this
paper confirm the need to put more attention on the role of non cognitive abilities and
show that there is scope for policy makers to increase participation to higher education
among teenagers from disadvantaged background by “manipulating” their non cognitive
traits.
Nevertheless it remains clear that barriers to widening participation also include other
factors and primarily access to financial resources, so that an optimal widening participa-
tion policy would need not to just “inspire” teenagers from low socio-economic status, but
also to ensure that they have access to the financial means necessary to afford the costs
of going to college.
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1.9 Tables and Figures
Figure 1.3: Widening Participation activities carried out by a sample of colleges.
Source: Bowes et al. (2013)
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics for QLFS and LSYPE samples.
QLFS LSYPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Sample Eligible Non Eligible (2)-(3) Full Sample Eligible Non Eligible (6)-(7)
Female 0.497 0.500 0.495 0.005 0.485 0.489 0.480 0.009
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
White 0.849 0.843 0.854 -0.011 0.877 0.878 0.876 0.002
(0.358) (0.364) (0.353) (0.328) (0.328) (0.329)
Urban 0.808 0.915 0.725 0.190*** 0.796 0.907 0.69 0.216***
(0.394) (0.279) (0.446) (0.403) (0.29) (0.463)
London 0.087 0.068 0.102 -0.034*** 0.106 0.0721 0.139 -0.067***
(0.282) (0.251) (0.303) (0.308) (0.259) (0.346)
Post 16 education 0.683 0.625 0.732 -0.107*** 0.641 0.540 0.732 -0.192***
(0.463) (0.484) (0.443) (0.480 (0.498) (0.443)
Higher Education 0.352 0.337 0.363 -0.026** 0.399 0.284 0.499 -0.214***
(0.477) (0.473) (0.484) (0.490) (0.450) (0.451)
log Parental Income 5.937 5.808 6.019 -0.211*** 3.053 2.976 3.123 -0.147***
(0.778) (0.725) (0.800) (0.541) (0.55) (0.523)
Father post-16 education 0.371 0.261 0.412 -0.151*** 0.443 0.331 0.537 -0.206***
(0.483) (0.439) (0.492) (0.497) (0.471) (0.499)
Mother post-16 education 0.427 0.298 0.507 -0.209*** 0.369 0.273 0.46 -0.187***
(0.495) (0.458) (0.500) (0.482) (0.445) (0.498)
Mean Coefficients. Standard Deviations in parentheses. Estimates in columns (4) and (6) clustered at census ward level.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics for NPD sample.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full Sample Eligible Non Eligible (2)-(3)
N 661,265 315,843 345,422
Female share 0.486 0.488 0.485 0.003**
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
White 0.806 0.819 0.792 0.026***
(0.395) (0.385) (0.406)
Free School Meal Eligibility 0.160 0.219 0.0976 0.118***
(0.367) (0.413) (0.297)
Number of A levels 2.722 2.306 2.886 -0.58***
(1.606) (1.667) (1.526)
Key Stage 4 A* 0.388 0.168 1.213 -0.362***
(1.298) (0.858) (1.606)
Key Stage 3 total points (of 141) 97.925 91.702 103.084 -11.382***
(27.10) (27.37) (25.69)
Key Stage 2 English mark 59.93 57.01 62.56 -5.56***
(14.47) (14.58) (13.86)
Mean Coefficients. Standard Deviations in parentheses
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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Figure 1.4: Aspirations: probability of stating to be likely to apply to university.
∗The graph shows Local Linear Regression estimates with Triangular Kernel
. weights. The solid vertical line indicates the cutoff point. The dashed
. vertical lines indicate the boundaries determined by the optimal bandwidth
. as used in table 1.3.
Figure 1.5: Aspirations: WP effect by bandwidth. LSYPE.
∗The graph shows the estimated coefficient and its 95% confidence interval
. for varying values of bandwidth. The solid vertical line indicates the optimal
. bandwidth as used in table 1.3.
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Table 1.3: Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on aspirations.
Parametric specification Non parametric specification
First Order Second Order Third Order Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal
Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Aspirations (LSYPE)
ITT 0.044** 0.044** 0.044** 0.0439** 0.0436* 0.0387***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.0188) (0.026) (0.014)
Bandwidth 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.146 0.073 0.292
R-squared 0.0192 0.0194 0.0194
Observations 31,555 52,937 60,452 63,338 63,338 63,338
Baseline (RHS) 0.599 0.598 0.597 0.527 0.520 0.519
∗ Pooled panel sample. Standard Errors clustered at the census ward level in parentheses. Non
parametric specification is Local Linear Regression with triangular Kernel weights. Optimal
bandwidth is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010).
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Figure 1.6: Probability of staying on in full time education at age 16, QLFS and LSYPE.
∗The graphs show Local Linear Regression estimates with Triangular Kernel weights.The solid vertical line
indicates the cutoff point. The dashed vertical lines indicate the boundaries determined by the optimal
bandwidth as used in table 1.4.
Figure 1.7: Probability of staying on in full time education at age 16: WP effect by band-
width. QLFS and LSYPE.
∗The graphs show the estimated coefficient and its 95% confidence interval for varying choices of bandwidth.
The solid vertical line indicates the optimal bandwidth as used in table 1.4.
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Table 1.4: Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on Schooling Choices at
16.
Parametric specification Non parametric specification
First Order Second Order Third Order Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal
Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
FT School at 16 (QLFS)
ITT 0.040* 0.038* 0.036* 0.032* 0.0157 0.022
(0.021) (0.023) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028) (0.015)
Bandwidth 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.164 0.082 0.328
R-squared 0.0059 0.0223 0.0285
Observations 12,162 21,426 24,360 25365 25365 25365
Baseline (RHS) 0.685 0.682 0.680 0.686 0.696 0.694
FT School at 16 (LSYPE)
ITT 0.050** 0.064** 0.063** 0.0452 0.0499 0.0356*
(0.025) (0.027) (0.032) (0.027) (0.039) (0.021)
Bandwidth 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.149 0.074 0.298
R-squared 0.0087 0.0287 0.0406
Observations 5,477 9,211 10,543 11,071 11,071 11,071
Baseline (RHS) 0.705 0.703 0.704 0.641 0.644 0.632
∗ Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses. Non parametric specification is Local Linear
Regression with triangular Kernel weights. Optimal bandwidth is computed according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2010).
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Figure 1.8: Probability of enrolling to a Higher Education Institution at age 18. QLFS and
LSYPE.
∗The graphs show Local Linear Regression estimates with Triangular Kernel weights.The solid vertical line
indicates the cutoff point. The dashed vertical lines indicate the boundaries determined by the optimal
bandwidth as used in table 1.5.
Figure 1.9: Probability of enrolling to a Higher Education Institution at age 18: WP effect
by bandwidth.
∗The graphs show the estimated coefficient and its 95% confidence interval for varying choices of bandwidth.
The solid vertical line indicates the optimal bandwidth as used in table 1.5.
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Table 1.5: Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on Schooling Choices at
18.
Parametric specification Non parametric specification
First Order Second Order Third Order Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal
Polynomial Polynomial Polynomial Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
College at 18 (QLFS)
ITT -0.007 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.007
(0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.027) (0.034) (0.019)
Bandwidth 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.127 0.064 0.255
R-squared 0.0022 0.0035 0.0044
Observations 13,923 24,444 27,965 29,210 29,210 29,210
Baseline (RHS) 0.393 0.396 0.400 0.390 0.388 0.382
College at 18 (LSYPE)
ITT 0.040 0.029 0.035 0.015 0.025 0.016
(0.028) (0.032) (0.037) (0.025) (0.034) (0.021)
Bandwidth 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.236 0.118 0.472
R-squared 0.0093 0.0305 0.0478
Observations 7,833 14,139 16,241 15,909 15,909 15,909
Baseline (RHS) 0.457 0.497 0.494 0.366 0.364 0.361
∗ Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses. Non parametric specification is Local
Linear Regression with triangular Kernel weights. Optimal bandwidth is computed according to Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2010).
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Table 1.6: Heterogeneous effects by income quantile.
Non parametric specification
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Likely to apply to university (LSYPE) 0.032 0.065* 0.056 0.041
(0.038) (0.037) (0.035) (0.039)
[0.177] [0.103] [0.122] [0.120]
12120 12397 13245 10255
Continue Education at age 16 (QLFS) 0.031 0.031 0.148** -0.003 0.040
(0.070) (0.063) (0.070) (0.047) (0.046)
[0.113] [0.135] [0.112] [0.207] [0.159]
1727 1720 1667 1883 2254
Continue Education at age 16 (LSYPE) 0.033 0.096** 0.021 0.028
(0.056) (0.048) (0.050) (0.046)
[0.231] [0.180] [0.145] [0.162]
2040 1888 2299 2267
Enrolled to University at age 18 (QLFS) -0.012 -0.039 -0.032 -0.041 0.060
(0.049) (0.051) (0.055) (0.054) (0.040)
[0.227] [0.186] [0.138] [0.110] [0.287]
2076 2064 2023 2319 2909
Enrolled to University at age 18 (LSYPE) -0.025 0.053 0.014 0.153*
(0.079) (0.067) (0.054) (0.080)
[0.0923] [0.117] [0.166] [0.106]
2697 2922 3593 3094
∗ Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses; optimal bandwidth
computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010) in brackets; number of
observations in italics.
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Table 1.7: Heterogeneous effects by cognitive ability quantile.
Non parametric specification
P1 P2 P3 P4
Likely to apply to university (LSYPE) 0.047 0.073* 0.021 0.0004
(0.032) (0.040) (0.033) (0.024)
[0.155] [0.122] [0.154] [0.160]
14763 14701 14707 14600
Continue Education at age 16 (LSYPE) -0.062 0.118* 0.017 0.034
(0.072) (0.068) (0.052) (0.037)
[0.096] [0.101] [0.145] [0.122]
2246 2546 2674 2893
Enrolled to University at age 18 (LSYPE) -0.0157 0.0317 0.0534 -0.0336
(0.045) (0.049) (0.056) (0.054)
[0.124] [0.153] [0.158] [0.178]
3398 3688 3837 4011
∗ Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses; optimal
bandwidth computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010) in
brackets; number of observations in italics.
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Table 1.8: Heterogeneous effects by income and cognitive ability quantile.
Non parametric specification
Q1/Q2-P1/P2 Q1/Q2-P3/P4 Q3/Q4-P1/P2 Q3/Q4-P3/P4
Likely to apply to university (LSYPE) 0.096** -0.023 0.052 0.043
(0.044) (0.034) (0.060) (0.035)
[0.106] [0.194] [0.090] [0.120]
13442 9386 8218 13524
Continue Education at age 16 (LSYPE) 0.108 0.064 0.072 -0.006
(0.071) (0.074) (0.071) (0.038)
[0.116] [0.096] [0.169] [0.178]
2057 1642 1498 2755
Enrolled to University at age 18 (LSYPE) 0.101* -0.121 0.089 0.015
(0.054) (0.010) (0.071) (0.054)
[0.106] [0.068] [0.095] [0.192]
2790 2539 2052 4165
∗ Each column reports estimates for quartiles Q of income distribution and quartiles P of ability
distribution. Standard Errors in parentheses; optimal bandwidth computed according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2010) in brackets; number of observations in italics.
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Figure 1.10: Effect on academic achievements at age 18. NPD.
∗The graphs show Local Linear Regression estimates with Triangular Kernel weights.The solid vertical line
indicates the cutoff point. The dashed vertical lines indicate the boundaries determined by the optimal
bandwidth as used in table 1.9.
Figure 1.11: Effect on academic achievements at age 18: WP effect by bandwidth.
∗The graphs show the estimated coefficient and its 95% confidence interval for varying choices of bandwidth.
The solid vertical line indicates the optimal bandwidth as used in table 1.9.
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Table 1.9: Regression Discontinuity Results. Effect of WP policies on academic achievements
at age 18. NPD.
Non parametric specification
Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Outcome: Number of A levels Total Point Score
ITT 0.0000115 0.016 0.003 1.600 4.329 1.997
(0.026) (0.035) (0.003) (5.931) (8.270) (4.346)
Bandwidth 0.1554 0.0777 0.3109 0.0998 0.0499 0.1997
Observations 236,283 236,283 236,283 236,283 236,283 236,283
Baseline (RHS) 0.599 0.598 0.597 0.5271
∗ Pooled panel sample. Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses. Non
parametric specification is Local Linear Regression with triangular Kernel weights. Optimal
bandwidth is computed according to Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010).
Number of A levels is total number of GCE/VCE A/AS Level and GCE AS/VCE Double
Award Level passes (A Level equivalencies); Total Point Score is the sum of QVCA points
obrained by student at Key Stage 5, for details:
http://www.education.gov.uk/schools/performance/archive/16to18_08/d4.shtml
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Figure 1.12: Distribution of main covariates across the discontinuity threshold. QLFS.
Figure 1.13: Distribution of main covariates across the discontinuity threshold. LSYPE.
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Table 1.10: Specification Checks: Distribution of main covariates across the discontinuity
threshold. Non parametric Estimates.
QLFS LSYPE
Female 0.0241 0.0352
(0.021) (0.024)
[25365] [15419]
White -0.0113 -0.0257
(0.024) (0.018)
[25365] [15732]
Household Size 0.050 0.0485
(0.078) (0.057)
[25365] [11713]
log Parental Income -0.073 -0.149
(0.047) (0.461)
[9251] [11726]
Father with College 0.005 0.027
(0.023) (0.030)
[14283] [14739]
Mother with College 0.044 0.031
(0.038) (0.022)
[12705] [14197]
∗ Standard Errors in parentheses.
Estimates are obtained through
Local Linear Regression with
triangular Kernel weights.
Bandwidth is computed according to
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010).
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Table 1.11: Specification Checks: Falsification exercise. LSYPE.
Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Likely to apply to College
ITT -0.004 0.020 0.008
(0.023) (0.031) (0.016)
Bandwidth 0.131 0.0655 0.262
Observations 63,338 63,338 63,338
Baseline (RHS) 0.556 0.546 0.564
Continue Education at age 16
ITT 0.008 0.043 0.027
(0.031) (0.042) (0.023)
Bandwidth 0.157 0.0785 0.314
Observations 11,071 11,071 11,071
Baseline (RHS) 0.684 0.670 0.693
Enrolled to University at age 18
ITT 0.015 0.060 0.034
(0.037) (0.051) (0.027)
Bandwidth 0.125 0.0625 0.250
Observations 15,909 15,909 15,909
Baseline (RHS) 0.423 0.411 0.410
∗ Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses;
optimal bandwidth is computed according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2010).
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Table 1.12: Specification Checks: Falsification exercise. QLFS.
Optimal 1/2 Optimal 2 Optimal
Bandwidth Bandwidth Bandwidth
Continue Education at age 16
ITT 0.003 0.010 0.0005
(0.017) (0.023) (0.013)
Bandwidth 0.09 0.045 0.18
Observations 53,749 53,749 53,749
Baseline (RHS) 0.680 0.682 0.686
Enrolled to University at age 18
ITT 0.008 0.013 0.002
(0.012) (0.016) (0.009)
Bandwidth 0.0894 0.0447 0.1788
Observations 55,090 55,090 55,090
Baseline (RHS) 0.119 0.116 0.125
∗ Standard Errors clustered at census ward level in parentheses;
optimal bandwidth is computed according to Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2010).
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1.10 Appendices
1.10.1 Proof that ∂h
∗
∂a
< 0, in the case of binding credit constraints
Let: F ≡ −u′(y0 + w0 (1− h∗)− τ h∗ + d¯) + βu′(w1 a f(h∗, a)−Rd¯) w1 a f ′h
i.e. the left hand side of the first order condition defined in equation 1.9
By implicit function theorem:
∂h∗
∂a
= − ∂F/∂a
∂F/∂h∗
I first study the sign of
∂F
∂a
:
∂F
∂a
= βu′(c1)
[
w1 a f
′′
ha + w1 f
′
h
]
+ βu′′(c1)
[
w1 a f
′
a + w1f(h, a)
]
w1 a f
′
h
The latter will be positive if:
− u
′(c1)
u′′(c1)
>
a f ′a + f(h, a)
a f ′′ha + f
′
h
w1 a f
′
h
I assume, to simplify the expression above, that:
u(·) = log(·) and f(h, a) = aα h(1−α)
(The results hold for any CES ability production function.)
Under such assumptions and after simplifying, the condition above becomes:
c1 > f(h, a) w1 a ⇔
⇔ f(h, a) w1 a−Rd > f(h, a) w1 a
which is never satisfied because d > 0. Therefore:
∂F
∂a
< 0 for all credit constrained individuals.
I now assess the sign of
∂F
∂h∗
:
∂F
∂h∗
= u′′(c0)(w0 + τ)2 + βu′′(c1) (w1af ′h)
2 + w1 a f
′′
h β u
′(c1)
which is also negative because of the concavity of the utility and of the production function.
It thus follows that:
∂h∗
∂a
= − ∂F/∂a
∂F/∂h∗
< 0 for all credit constrained individuals, Q.E.D.
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1.10.2 Summary of effects of raising aspirations
1. s>0 and perfect credit markets:
High y0 Low y0
High θc + +
Low θc + +
2. s>0 and imperfect credit markets:
High y0 Low y0
High θc + +/-
Low θc + +/-
3. s=0 and perfect credit markets:
High y0 Low y0
High θc + 0
Low θc 0 0
4. s=0 and imperfect credit markets:
High y0 Low y0
High θc + 0
Low θc 0 0
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Chapter 2
Home or Away?
Gender differences in the effects of
an expansion of tertiary education
supply
Abstract
The objective of this work is to estimate the effects of the expansion of tertiary education
supply onto schooling decisions of Italian young high school graduates. To do so I exploit
a quasi-experimental setting given by the reform of the tertiary education system imple-
mented in 2001. The reform was embraced at different points in time and with different
degrees. I exploit this geographical variation through a difference-in-differences strategy
to estimate the impact of the increase of tertiary education supply on enrollment and
mobility decisions.
I find major gender differences: the increase of local tertiary education supply generated a
significant increase in females’ enrollment rates leaving unchanged those of males; men, on
the other hand, switched from studying outside their province of residence to studying at
the local university. I interpret these results as suggesting the existence of a relationship
of substitutability between studying away from home and studying at the local university
for boys, but not for girls. Evidence is provided that girls face a higher non pecuniary
cost of moving away from home than boys.
The results are robust to various definitions of treatment areas and to different method-
ological approaches. They eventually lead to the conclusion that the increase of local
tertiary education supply can provide a powerful tool to enhance females’ educational
attainment and thus better exploit the country’s human capital potential.
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2.1 Introduction
The analysis of investment in human capital and of its drivers is key for understanding
the distribution of income across individuals in the society and “[..] explaining differences
among regions, countries and time periods” (Becker and Chiswick, 1966). In all developed
countries access to higher education is not equally distributed across the population: in
the US 57% of individuals from the top household income quartile obtain a college degree,
while the percentage for those from the bottom quartile is just 10% (Bailey and Dynarski,
2011); in the UK the percentage of 23 year olds holding a higher education degree is 46%
for pupils whose parental income falls in the top 20%, while for those in the bottom 20%
the percentage falls to 9% (Blanden and Machin, 2004); in Italy 90% of children whose
father has a college degree enroll to college, whereas the figure halves for those whose
father has less than secondary education (elaboration on ISTAT (2010a) data), similarly
the proportion of those completing college is 65% for the first group and just 7% for the
latter (Checchi et al., 1999).
Why is it that some people invest in college education and some do not if returns to
this investment are large and positive? And why is it people from lower socio-economic
background that invest less in education when their marginal returns from it would be
higher?
Moving from the seminal works of Ben-Porath (1967) and Becker (1967), economists tradi-
tionally framed schooling choices in terms of a (current) cost versus (future) benefit anal-
ysis and argued that it would be mostly the presence of credit constraints that prevents
individuals from less aﬄuent families to pursue the optimal level of education (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 2001; Kane, 2003). These pupils would lack the financial resources needed to
face the costs of attaining a college degree (e.g. tuition fees, living expenses, books etc.)
and would not manage to obtain them on the credit market.
A more recent strand of literature has rather stressed the importance of previously accu-
mulated abilities in determining individuals’ educational patterns and the resulting social
inequalities: pupils who do not obtain a higher education degree would be those who lack
a sufficiently high level of (cognitive and non cognitive) abilities to successfully attend
college (Heckman, 1999; Heckman and Carneiro, 2003). The gaps in accumulated ability
would be related to different parental environments (typically parental education) which,
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in turn, are reflected into parental income (Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
A second widely known fact related to the present work, is that in all countries in the
developed world the number of female students in college has outweighed that of men in
spite of generally lower returns to education on the labor market (Jacobs (1996), Bailey
and Dynarski (2011)).1 This is associated with girls being better prepared and performing
better at any school level in comparison to their male peers (Jacob (2002), Goldin et al.
(2006), Lavy and Schlosser (2011)).2 and also being more responsive than boys to most
education policy interventions (Long, 2007; Dynarski, 2007; Angrist et al., 2009; Garibaldi
et al., 2012)
This paper exploits a reform of the Italian university system that was implemented in
2001, to analyze the impact of geographically expanding the supply of tertiary education
on individuals’ schooling choices, focusing on the difference between the reactions of boys
and girls and trying to identify the mechanisms which determine such reactions.
The contribution of the paper is thus twofold: on the one hand it fits into the existing
literature about the determinants of schooling choices with the idea that the expansion
of tertiary education supply to previously unreached or under supplied areas can lower
the associated direct costs of attending college for individuals living in that area (Card,
1993) and thus can push into college some of those for whom the costs of education were
outweighing the stream of future returns. In this spirit, recent works have analyzed the
impact of geographically expanding the supply of primary (Duflo, 2001), or tertiary educa-
tion (Card, 1993; Holzer, 2007) finding strong and significant positive effects for primary,
while the results for tertiary education are not conclusive.
On the other hand, in the attempt of uncovering some of the mechanisms which lay behind
the decision of attending college, the paper also delves into mobility choices (whether to
study at the local university or move to a different city) so as to understand if there exist
non financial costs associated with moving away from home which eventually prevent some
individuals from obtaining a higher education degree. The literature on students’ mobility
1Goldin (1998) and more recently Kaufmann et al. (2013), argue that this “female college enrollment
puzzle” may partly be explained by the existence of large returns to college education on the marriage
market.
2Some authors (Malamud and Schanzenbach (2007), Lavy (2004)) provide evidence that teachers tend
to rate the performance of girls more generously than that of boys thus exacerbating the gender gap in
school achievements.
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choices is much less rich: some aspects are covered by studies on schooling choices (Hoxby,
2004), while Ordine and Lupi (2009) provide a contribution to the analysis of the Italian
context.
Finally, by carrying out all the analysis in a gender perspective, the paper assesses whether
boys and girls respond differently to the analyzed policy intervention and thus contributes
to the above mentioned literature on gender and education.
From a policy perspective, finally, it is particularly interesting to look at the impact
of expanding the supply of tertiary education in Italy in the light of the comparison with
other OECD countries in terms of human capital production: Italy is characterized by
low enrollment (48% versus 60% OECD average nas of 2011) and graduation rates (21%
versus 28% OECD average)3 coupled with extremely high drop out rates (55% versus 31%
OECD average)4 and these figures translate into the lowest values of stock of tertiary
human capital among OECD countries.5
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the Italian context and
the reform of the university system of 1999; Section 2.3 introduces the data and provides
some descriptive statistics; Section 2.4 outlines the identification and estimation strategies
adopted; Section 2.5 describes the estimation results; Section 2.6 digs into the mechanisms
that lie behind the results and finally Section 2.7 reports some specification tests and
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 The Italian university system and the reform of 1999
The Italian university system has traditionally been organized centrally with the national
government being responsible for the institution of new colleges, the hiring of new teach-
ers, the design of the academic curricula and the allocation of public funds.
Moreover, admission to college has been free until 2012: any student with a secondary
education degree could enroll into college without the need of passing a test or obtaining
3Graduation rate is computed as the number of graduates, regardless of their age, divided by population
at typical graduation age; OECD (2012).
4OECD (2009).
5Martins et al. (2007).
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particularly good grades at school.6
The system was progressively reformed in the course of the Nineties: after being
granted a certain level of “autonomy” for what concerned their internal regulations (Law n.
168 of 1989), the design of the academic curricula (Law n. 341 of 1990) and the allocation
of the budget (Law n. 537 of 1993), in 1998 colleges were given the possibility of opening
(or closing) new schools (facolta`) and/or courses without central approval, conditional on
self-financing the initiative (DPR n. 25 of 27/1/1998).
The slow and gradual geographical expansion of tertiary education supply that followed
the reform of 1998, was strongly accelerated by a new and large reform of the university
system that was passed in 1999 (Law n. 509 of 1999) and implemented in 2001. This re-
form substituted the traditional curricula of four to five years of length with a “two-step”
mechanism in which students get a three year undergraduate degree first and a two year
advanced degree after that.
The two reforms of 1998 and 1999 came as a response to a sharp declining trend in
the rates of college enrollment that had been observed during the Nineties (according to
the elaborations of Cappellari and Lucifora (2009), college enrollment rates in Italy had
decreased by 8 percent between 1995 and 1998). Through the reform the Government
intended to reduce both the direct costs of education by bringing university closer to the
students, and the opportunity costs by shortening the duration of studies from five to
three years.
This re-design of the curricula, accompanied by the institution of new funds for tertiary
education, and combined with the possibility for colleges to open new schools without the
approval of the central government, quickly translated into a massive expansion of tertiary
education supply all over the country: whereas there were around 320 first level courses
before the reform (of which about 170 were four year courses and 150 were three year
diplomas), in 2001 the number of first level courses had increased to almost 1200 first level
courses (figure 2.1).
This increase, nevertheless, was not uniform all across the national territory: the reform
6Some exceptions to this principle were Medical Schools and some other scientific schools which required
small students numbers.
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generated a significant expansion of smaller and peripheral universities which, supported
by the local political authorities, grew substantially in the attempt of generating and sus-
taining local economic development, whereas the major and older universities, which were
already offering all types of degrees, were just marginally affected.
Several authors evaluated the effects of the reform of 1999 on enrollment decisions and
educational attainment (Cappellari and Lucifora (2009), Di Pietro and Cutillo (2006),
Bratti et al. (2006)), on equality of access to tertiary education (Brunori et al., 2010), and
on labor market outcomes (Bosio and Leonardi, 2010) focusing on the effects generated
by the shortening of the duration of studies and finding that this generated a large and
significant increase in enrollment rates but lowered the returns to college on the labor
market. This paper expands the existing literature by analyzing the effects of the geo-
graphical expansion of college supply generated by the reform, looking at both enrollment
and mobility choices and focusing on gender heterogeneities .
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
This study mainly relies on three sources of data. The first are the records of the Ministry
of Education (MIUR) which provide complete information about the changes that took
place on the supply side. Starting from 1998 the Ministry has been collecting yearly
data about all tertiary level courses available in each town of Italy. It is thus possible
to precisely identify which courses are offered in which province even if the courses are
provided by the university of another province (which is typically the case of decentralized
campuses whose number has exploded in the Nineties).
The use of the MIUR data allows characterizing the alternatives provided to each
single student after high school depending on her province of usual residence (where she
attended high school). Depending on this, every student will be faced with a different
degree of intensity of the change of educational supply induced by the reform; for example
a student that lives in a small town may have seen the constitution of a new campus where
there wasn’t any, while a student living in a big metropolitan area would be faced with
only a marginal increase of the education supply.
Figure 2.1 shows the trend of the number of first level degrees offered, the red vertical
line represents the year of adoption of the reform. The blue line at the top is the aver-
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Figure 2.1: Average number of degrees offered to high school graduates per province, by
type of degree
age total number of degrees offered to high school graduates in each province per year.
The figure shows a significant increase in the average supply of tertiary education to high
school graduates. This increase is also split by type of course offered: it appears that the
abolition of the old four or five year curricula (Corsi di laurea) and of the three year long
Diplomas (Diplomi Universitari) was more than offset by the creation of the three year
long first level degrees (Corsi di laurea di primo livello), while changes in the supply of
other types of courses are irrelevant.
Despite its sharp increase in 2001, the number of degrees offered might be a spuri-
ous measure of the actual change in the supply of tertiary education as often one degree
was split into two or more without any actual increase of human nor financial resources.
Therefore alternative measures of educational supply have been considered: the number
of colleges, the number of degrees, the number of departments (facolta`) and the number
of subject areas, as coded by the OECD, covered by the degrees offered in each province.
The most relevant changes in the supply of tertiary education took place in provinces
were new university campuses were opened. Figure 2.2 shows the trend in the number
of university campuses (average number per province) existing in Italy between 1998 and
2005. The data gathered by MIUR reveal that between 1998 and 2005 14 new university
campuses were opened in provinces were there previously was not any; nevertheless this
process was not limited to the year of the reform but started earlier.
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Another available measure of educational supply is the number of departments (facolta`)
present in each province. This provides a good proxy of the financial and human resources
effectively available. Its trend is shown in figure 2.2.
A final option is to look at the variety of courses available: the OECD classifies all
tertiary level degrees into fifteen subject areas. The present work will consider that the
actual supply of tertiary education has effectively increased whenever degrees belonging to
a new disciplinary area are offered. The higher the number of subject areas covered by the
degrees offered in a province, the higher the supply of tertiary education in that province.
The trend of variety is also represented in figure 2.2. This last measure of educational
supply will be the one I will focus on: the idea is that a student will effectively be attracted
to university if she is offered the field of studies she likes.
Figure 2.2: Variation in the supply of tertiary education
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The MIUR data show that a significant increase in the average variety of degrees of-
fered by each province took place between 1999 and 2002, while the increase between 2002
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and 2005 is only marginal (figure 2.2). Only eight provinces remained stable over 90% of
variety of university supply and these were Turin, Milan, Padua, Rome, Florence, Naples,
Bari and Palermo. Overall, as shown in figure 2.2, all reported measures of educational
supply showed a significant increase between 1999 and 2005.
The second source of data used are the Istat surveys on high school graduates (Istat
(2004), Istat (2007b), Istat (2010a)); these are conducted every three years on a nation-
ally representative sample of high school graduates who are interviewed three years after
completion of high school and asked about their working and educational experience in
the past three years. The surveys contain detailed information about the students’ family
background and can be merged with the MIUR data on the basis of the province in which
the student attended high school. This allows us to recover the exact local educational
supply that each student was faced with before and after the reform.
Given that the reform has been adopted in 2001 (despite being approved in 1999) I
use the surveys of 1998 and 2004 high school graduates, so as to have observations both
before and after the reform, with a time window large enough not to be concerned about
anticipation nor transitory effects.
Table 3.6 shows the main characteristics of the sample: the upper panel refers to indi-
vidual characteristics, the lower panel to province characteristics; individuals and provinces
are split into a “Treatment” and a “Control” group depending on the magnitude of the
increase in tertiary education supply experienced, where provinces in which the number of
subject areas covered by the degrees offered to new students increased by more than 25%
will be defined as “Treatment” provinces, while provinces where the increase was below
this threshold will form the “Control” group (see Section 3.4 for details).
Labor market characteristics are derived from the Italian Labor Force Surveys (Istat,
2008). Specifically, the regressions will include: a youth unemployment rate at province
level for the age class of 15-24 so as to proxy for the opportunity cost of higher education
and the employability premium for college versus high school graduates at the age of 35-39
to proxy for the returns to college. The reason why this specific age group is chosen is that
Italy is characterized by a slow process of entrance of young people into the labor market
which implies that the investment in tertiary education typically yields its full returns with
60
respect to stopping after high school only several years after graduation (appendix 2.10.1).
Table 2.2 reports the share of high school graduates who enrolled in college straight
after completing high school revealing that no particular increase in enrollment rates took
place in the year of the reform.7 Yet the table shows that the pattern of women’s enroll-
ment rates differs significantly from that of men: while men’s enrollment rates increased
by 2.21 percentage points between 1998 and 2001 and by only 0.59 between 2001 and
2004, women’s increased by around 6.5 percentage points both between 1998 and 2001
and between 2001 and 2004.
The second outcome variable of interest is the propensity to mobility of high school
graduates, i.e. the probability of enrolling to a college outside the province of usual
residence conditional on enrolling to college at all. Indeed if the reform changed the
supply of tertiary education opportunities available locally, then, in order to evaluate the
reform, it is crucial to understand how men and women changed their propensity to move
away from home to attend university.
Table 2.3 shows that in terms of inter-regional mobility in 1998 girls were moving less
than boys, no matter where they came from; their mobility though increased substantially
between 1998 and 2004 so that the difference between boys and girls disappeared (except
for the insular regions of Sicily and Sardinia). Looking at inter-province mobility (table
2.4), girls’ mobility also increased relatively to boys’ so that in 2004 they were eventually
more likely than boys to attend university in a province different from that of high school.
2.4 Identification Strategy
The set of reforms to the university system which took place in Italy during the Nineties
provide a source of exogenous variation to the supply side structure and thus can allow us
to identify its causal impact on students’ choices.
7The figures are very different if one considers all individuals who enrolled in college within three years
from high school graduation rather than considering only those who enrolled straight after. Indeed in
the first case the rates of enrollment exhibit a jump of about 10 percentage points between 1998 and
2001. Such marked difference is presumably due to the fact that the reform of 1999 further introduced a
mechanism that allowed professionals of several sectors (typically employees of the public sector) to have
their working experience recognized as course credits. This initiative brought to college a vast cohort of
employed individuals, thus plausibly leading to a temporary inflation of the observed overall enrollment
rates.
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In this work the effects of the expansion of tertiary education supply will be estimated
by exploiting the fact that the supply side shocks induced by the reform of 1999 were
relatively larger in some areas than others. A difference-in-differences (DD) approach will
thus be employed (Ashenfelter, 1978; Heckman and Robb, 1985; Blundell and Costa-Dias,
2009).
This work considers that high school graduates have been exposed to different shocks
to tertiary education opportunities depending on their year of birth (year of high school
diploma) and province where they attended high school; the exogeneity of such character-
istics and the unexpected timing of the reform will ensure the identification of the effects
of supply side changes. In fact, by pinning down the province of the individual as that
in which he attended high school, we rule out the possibility of strategic migration, given
that, at the time individuals had to choose high school, the reform of university could
not be anticipated. The identification strategy thus relies on the comparison between the
schooling decisions of individuals who graduated from high school before and after the
enforcement of the reform, having attended high school in provinces where, due to the
reform, the supply of tertiary education increased markedly (i.e. treatment group) and in
provinces where the increase of supply was not significant (i.e. control group).
In order to define the treatment and control groups, this paper looks at the change
in the number of subject areas (as described in Section 2.3) covered by first level degrees
available to youths upon completion of high school. This can be held the most accurate
measure of the effective magnitude of the change in the supply of tertiary education as
disciplinary areas better proxy for the actual variety of the educational supply.8
Treated provinces are thus defined as those in which the number of subject areas covered
by first level degrees available to high school graduates increased by more than 25% be-
tween 1998 and 2004.9 These provinces are pictured in figure 2.3 and listed in appendix
2.10.2.
8Robustness checks in section 2.7 will extend the analysis to the other measures of higher education
supply introduced in section 2.3.
9Section 2.7 also provides sensitivity analysis to the 25% threshold.
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Figure 2.3: Treated and Control Provinces, by Variety
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the average number of subject areas per province in the treatment
and control groups between 1998 and 2004. By construction of the treatment group, the
supply of tertiary education presents a kink in 2001 for treated provinces while it remains
flat for the control ones.
Figure 2.4: Average Variety of Tertiary Education Supply in Treatment and Control
Provinces
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In order to get unbiased estimates the empirical strategy will rely on a key identifying
assumption which is that, conditional on individual observed characteristics, the change
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in average outcomes between before and after the reform for individuals in the treatment
group would have been the same as for individuals in the control group if the reform had
not taken place. This is equivalent to assuming that the treatment and the control group
satisfy a common trend assumption by which the slope of the long-run trend is the same
for both groups, whereas the level is not necessarily the same.
In the case considered, because treated provinces are by design of the policy intervention
poorer than the control ones, the level of enrollment rates and of the other socio-economic
observable variables will be lower; still what matters is that the slope is the same.10
The impact of the reform on the outcomes of interest will be estimated through equa-
tions of the following type:
Yipt = β1Tp + β2Postt + β3(Tp × Postt) + γ1Xipt + γ2Zpt + ipt (2.1)
where Yipt is the outcome of interest of individual i, who attended high school in province
p, graduating at time t; Tp = 1 identifies treated provinces, Postt = 1 indicates the wave
after the reform, Xipt are observable characteristics of individual i, in province p, at time
t and Zpt are province time-varying characteristics, while ipt is the usual individual error
term. The interaction term (Tp×Postt) will give the effect of the reform on the individuals
in the treatment group (Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, ATET ).11
The same regressions will be run separately for men and women in order to evaluate
whether the effects of such expansion of the supply of tertiary education were different
depending on the gender of the student.
The first equation estimated is the probability of enrollment to university of individual
i, who attended high school in province p, at time t, Pr(Eipt = 1); this will be estimated
through probit because imposing linearity with a dichotomous outcome variable would
likely yield predicted probabilities outside the [0,1] interval. A fully parametric linear
10This is equivalent to assuming that E[ipt|Treatp = 1, t] = E[(nip|Treatp) +mt] with E[mt|Treatp =
1] = E[mt|Treatp = 0] being the common trend component. This assumption will ensure that E[ipt1 −
ipt0 |Treatp = 1] = E[ipt1 − ipt0 |Treatp = 0] which is a first difference version of the usual error
independence assumption.
11Alternatively the estimating equation will include province fixed effects φp and drop the collinear
treatment dummy: Yipt = φp + β2Postt + β3(Tp × Postt) + γ1Xipt + γ2Zpt + ipt.
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index model with normally distributed error terms is employed and linearity in the index
is imposed.
A second outcome of interest is then the possible substitution effect between studying
out of one’s province of residence and studying locally: in other words we expect that
students will partially switch from studying in another province to studying in the local
university once this is significantly expanded.
I thus estimate Pr(Mipt = 1), i.e. the probability that individual i, who attended high
school in province p, at time t enrolled to university in a province different from p (Mipt = 0
will instead mean that she enrolled at the local university).
This probability will be estimated through standard probit first and then through a Heck-
man Two Step procedure (Heckman, 1979) to account for selection into enrollment (i.e.
only for those who actually enrolled to university can we observe the choice of where to
study). In this case the type of school attended is used as an instrument for selection into
university assuming therefore that this does affect the probability of enrolling to university
but not directly that of studying locally rather than away from home. The reason why
having attended a liceo is associated to a higher probability of going to college is mainly
an historical one: until 1969 only students who graduated from this type of school could
access college; while this restriction is not in place anymore, the licei have remained the
schools that traditionally prepare for college. Yet, as the probability of attending a liceo
is positively correlated with family income, one may be worried that the excludability
restriction is not satisfied; table 2.5 provides evidence that the vast majority of pupils who
enroll to college have attended a liceo and generally come from more aﬄuent families than
those who do not go to college, on the other hand among them there are no differences
between those who choose the local university and those who move neither in terms of
type of school attended nor in terms of family background.
2.5 Results
The use of a DD approach allows us to isolate the effects of the reform from any time
invariant characteristic as well as from those characteristics which do vary over time but
do so in the same way in the treated and control provinces.
As table 2.1 shows, treated and control provinces do systematically differ on observable
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characteristics, but this difference tends to be stable over time. Nevertheless, to rule out
the possibility that some of these characteristics may bias the estimates, all econometric
specifications will include both individual and province time varying characteristics. More-
over I allow for the possibility that standard errors are correlated among individuals living
in the same province and therefore will cluster them at the province level in all regressions.
Table 2.6 reports the probit estimation results for the probability of enrolling to college
straight after high school. The first line presents the marginal effect of the (Tp × Postt)
term, i.e. the ATET, the second and third rows respectively report the coefficients asso-
ciated to the time common trend (Postt) and the treatment group fixed effect (Tp); the
coefficients associated to the control variables instead are not reported for brevity but
all have the predicted signs: both individual characteristics and family background seem
to play a crucial role in determining the probability of attending university, with stu-
dents from licei being by far the most likely to enroll; moreover intergenerational mobility
seems to be very weak as there appears a very strong positive correlation between parents’
and children’s education. On the other hand, students living in areas where the rate of
youth unemployment is higher show a higher propensity to enrol to university, thus con-
firming the idea that they face a lower opportunity cost of staying out of the labor market.
The estimates in table 2.6 show a significant gender differential in the effects of the
local expansion of tertiary education opportunities: while men’s demand for education
turns out to be inelastic to changes on the supply side, women have responded to the
increase in educational supply with a significant increase in enrollment rates.12
It further appears that the treated provinces are associated with lower enrollment rates
(negative treatment fixed effect, Tp), and that for both male and female students there was
a positive common trend in enrollment rates (positive coefficient of Postt). The ATET
estimates show that over and above such trend there was a positive and significant effect
of the reform on female enrollment rates: an increase of the variety of local tertiary educa-
tion supply by at least 25% between 1998 and 2004 translated into an increase of women’s
enrollment rates between 6.2 and 7.8 percentage points, while men’s enrollment rates did
12The analysis has been carried out separately for enrollments within three years from high school
graduation and the results, omitted for brevity, are not qualitatively different, the effect on females ranging
between 4.8 and 5.4 percentage point (table 2.16).
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not show any significant increase.
Table 2.6 has so far shown that the average effect of the reform on girls from the
treated provinces was an increase in the propensity to enroll to university of about 6 to
7 percentage points. Turning to the analysis of mobility choices I will be able to identify
the effect of the reform on boys: Table 2.7 shows the results of the probit estimation of
Mipt.
All the specifications in table 2.7 include local labor market characteristics as control
variables: columns 1-3 use the absolute values of the province employability premium,
unemployment rate and per capita GDP, while columns 4-6 include them in terms of dif-
ference to the respective top quartile values with the idea that the decision to move will
crucially depend on the relative attractiveness of the destination with respect to the place
of departure.
The probit regressions show a strong decrease in the mobility of male students and no
effects on women. The ATET indicates that exposure to the increase of local educational
supply by more than 25% decreased the propensity of male students to study away from
home by between 6 and 7.7 percentage points.
This, coupled with the previous results on enrollment decisions, would suggest that
men substituted “education away” with “education at home”, while women who did not
have a tertiary education facility nearby tended to drop out of education after high school.
The results on mobility reported in table 2.7 may be biased because of sample selection:
students who are faced with the decision about whether to study “at home” or “away”
are only those who have already decided to get into tertiary education, therefore the coef-
ficients estimated in the probit regression above are likely to overestimate the magnitude
of the effect (downward bias).13 Yet, as the results in table 2.6 showed that the policy had
no impact on boys’ enrollment rates, we would expect the results for girls to be biased
rather than those for boys.
13This is because those who decide to select into tertiary education represent a positive selection of the
student population, i.e. it is the most capable and/or motivated students. On the other hand it is likely
that there would be a positive correlation between ability/motivation and the decision of studying away,
therefore not taking into account the selection process would overestimate the effect of the policy (as the
effect is negative, we will have downward bias).
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Still, to correct this bias, I employ a Heckman two-step procedure in which a dummy
variable for whether the student has attended a liceo or another type of school enters in
the specification of the probability of enrolment but is excluded from the mobility equation.
The results of the Heckman two step estimation, reported in Table 2.8, confirm the
qualitative results previously found in Table 2.7, even taking into account that enrolment
is not exogenous. They therefore support the idea for which the increase in the local supply
of tertiary education decreased the probability of studying away only for male students
who substituted “studying away” with “studying at home”. The magnitude of such effect
ranges between 3.2 and 4.3 percentage points, depending on whether one controls for the
absolute values of labor market characteristics or for the difference between local labor
market conditions and those of the highest quartile.
2.6 Mechanisms: the role of financial and cultural
constraints
While the results presented in section 2.5 show that there was a significant and systematic
difference between the effects of the reform on male and female students, it is crucial to
understand what are the underlying mechanisms determining such outcomes.
In particular, being able to disentangle the effect of financial constraints from that of
non financial ones would highlight what are the possible policy implications of the results
found in section 2.5. To do so I interacted the effect of the reform with two characteristics
of the household: whether the student’s father is a manager, to proxy for the household’s
economic status, and whether the mother has been to college, to proxy for the role of the
maternal model.
The results for enrollment decisions, which are presented in table 2.10, do not show
any clear pattern of difference between boys and girls in terms of enrollment decisions,
indeed neither for boys nor for girls are the interaction terms between the treatment effect
and the two family background characteristics significant.
Table 2.11, instead shows the interaction between the effects of the reform, maternal mod-
els and family income on mobility decisions. Here different patterns emerge depending
on the gender of the student: the marginal effects of the reform for girls whose father is
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a manager indicate that girls coming from more aﬄuent families were significantly more
likely to switch from college away from home to college close by whereas no similar pattern
of income heterogeneity emerges for boys.
This finding would suggest suggest that what prevents girls from moving away from home
is not budget constraints but rather some non financial costs that they take into account
when choosing whether and where to study.
To shed some more light on the nature of such costs I compare the effects of the reform
with an indicator of women’s role inside the family. The data provided by the Istat survey
on time use for 2003 (Istat, 2007a) are used, and the average time women spend everyday
on family care is compared with the region-wise estimated ATET for enrollment decisions.
Figure 2.5 shows the relation for men and women: while there appears to be no correlation
at all for men, the effect of the reform on female enrollment rates seems to be larger in
regions where women usually spend more time on family care.14
Figure 2.5: The role of cultural models: time use and the effects of the reform on enrollment
rates.
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14It would not be possible to include the regional heterogeneity in terms of time women spend on family
care in a regression like that in table 2.10 because this indicator does not vary over time.
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Despite being far from conclusive, the relations identified in this section seem to point
at the existence of a link between cultural factors and females’ costs of attending tertiary
education: in areas where women traditionally spend more time on family care, the expan-
sion of tertiary education supply can significantly enhance girls’ educational attainment
suggesting that the possibility of attending university without having to move away from
the family would decrease the perceived cost of schooling for these girls.
2.7 Specification checks
Common Trend Assumption The first type of concern that arises when using a DD
approach is that the underlying common trend assumption might not hold. (footnote 10)
Figure 2.4 showed that before 1998 and after 2004 the variety of tertiary education supply
was stable and followed the same trend in treated and control provinces. More importantly,
table 2.1 has proved that the differences in observable characteristics between treated and
control groups did not significantly change between before and after the reform: the
difference-in-difference estimates for individual characteristics were essentially null and
no significant change in trend was detected with respect to the local economic indicators
(employability premium, unemployment rate and GDP per capita). As a matter of fact
figure 2.6 shows that the treated provinces did not experience any extraordinary growth nor
significant transitory shock that might have pushed up average educational attainment.15
Figure 2.6: Specification checks: common trend in log GDP per capita.
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15Had this been the case we would be facing the so called ‘Ashenfelter’s dip’: selection into treatment
is driven by unobserved temporary shocks (Ashenfelter, 1978).
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In order to test the common trend assumption the same regressions are run on a
different time window: the treated and control provinces identified in section 2.4 are
thus compared over the time window 1995 to 1999. The results of this placebo exercise
are reported in tables 2.12 and 2.13: there is no effect on enrollment decisions and no
difference between boys and girls.
When looking at mobility decisions instead it appears that the treated provinces were
characterized by an excess decrease in mobility already before 2001, nevertheless there
was no difference between boys’ and girls’ behaviors.
Instrumental Variables Approach One may be concerned that the selection of
provinces into treatment might be demand driven and thus endogenous. In other words,
the expansion would have increased the educational supply only in areas where there was
anticipated unmet demand and thus the results would only be driven by such mechanism.
The fact that I find no effect on boys’ enrollments would suggest that this was not the
case: indeed had the government decided to increase the supply of tertiary education in
under supplied areas, then the increase in enrollments would have been positive for boys
as well.
Nevertheless, to cast away any concern of this type, I also perform an IV estimation to
account for the possible endogeneity of selection of provinces into treatment.
In order to find a valid and excludable instrument I use the toolkit of political economics
and decide to follow a strategy similar to that of Levitt (1997)16 and exploit proximity
to provincial elections at the time of the reform as an instrument for the increase in local
educational supply. The idea is that when local elections approach, local politicians will
want to expand the supply of visible public services to gain the public favor.
Table 2.14 shows the results of the IV regression, where the excluded instrument is a
dummy variable for whether provincial elections were held in 2001 or 2002. The first stage
shows a strong positive relationship between this variable and the likelihood of having
increased the supply of local tertiary education by more than 25% (i.e. the treatment
variable defined above).
In terms of effects on enrollments, the coefficients of the IV are similar to those of the
DD estimation in table 2.6 though not significant . Their similarity anyway reassures us
16Levitt (1997) estimates the effects of police control on crime exploiting the exogenous increase in the
number of policemen that usually takes place as local elections approaches.
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about the validity of the quasi experiment exploited in this paper.
With respect to mobility17 instead the coefficients are quite different from the previously
estimated ones (table 2.8). The positive sign of these coefficients is likely due to the
omission of the province fixed effects (which would be collinear with the instrument); nev-
ertheless the difference between the effect on boys and the effect on girls is very close to
the results of table 2.8.
Excluding big cities The same regressions have been run taking out of the sample
the students residing in the three biggest cities: Milan, Rome and Naples. This choice is
driven by the concern that these cities, which all belong to the comparison group, might
draw the average effect of the reform in the control group down and thus artificially ex-
pand the effect on the treated provinces.
The exclusion of these cities did not imply any relevant change in the estimates with the
coefficients associated to the ATET remaining almost identical both in magnitude and in
statistical significance (table 2.15).
Different Thresholds According to the definition introduced in Section 2.4, “treated
provinces” are those in which the increase in the variety of courses between 1998 and 2004
was larger than 25%. Such threshold is clearly arbitrary and corresponds to the 63rd
percentile in the distribution of the change in the variety of courses among the provinces.
Because the choice of this threshold is arbitrary, one might be concerned that the results
may be driven by this choice. For this reason this threshold has been shifted down to the
median and up to the 75th percentile.
Tables 2.16 and 2.17 show the results of this exercise: the effect of the increase in
tertiary education supply on female students’ enrollments is larger the higher the threshold,
i.e. the bigger the increase in supply. On the other hand, in all three cases there are no
effects on male students’ enrollments.
With respect to mobility choices then, boys’ propensity to choose the local university
rather than moving away from home increases proportionally with the threshold only in
the probit specification with labor market controls expressed in relative terms. In all other
17The Two Stage Least Squares are combined with the Heckman selection model by including the in
the IV regression the Inverse Mills Ratio calculated from the probit estimation of the Selection Equation
(Wooldridge, 2001).
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specifications the effect on boys is stable and always larger than that on girls, which is
never distinguishable from zero.
Different Treatments One might also be concerned that the results may be driven by
the definition of treatment chosen. For this reason the same estimation exercise has been
run under different definitions of treatment group. Increases in the number of universities,
in the number of departments (facolta`), and finally in the number of degrees available
to first year students at the time of enrollment have all been analyzed; as in the main
specification, the treatment is always defined for increases of more than 25% between
1998 and 2004.
Tables 2.18 and 2.19 show the results under these alternative definitions of treatment,
respectively for enrollment and mobility decisions.
The main results are robust to such different definitions of treatment, and in particular
those on enrollment rates, where, no matter how we define the increase in local educational
supply, girls respond to it with a significant increase in enrollment rates while boys don’t.
This is true in all specifications except the last two: effects of the increase in the number
of departments and in the number of degrees on enrollments within one year from high
school graduation. In the first case a positive strong effect is found on both boys and girls
decisions, while in the latter no effect is found on either group.
The results on mobility are less significant but maintain the direction indicated in the
main specification, with boys substituting education away from home with local education
while girls not.
Effects on quality of students An aspect which has not been fully analyzed in
this work regards the possibility that the reform and the consequent increase in enroll-
ments might have brought to university less capable students who eventually did not reach
graduation and crowded universities without making enough progress on their studies. To
address this concern estimates of the effects of the policy on the probability of interrupting
the studies, on the probability of attending classes regularly and on the number of exams
passed after three years from the beginning of the studies are presented. The results are
reported in table 2.20. Unfortunately these results are not fully informative because do
not take into account the sample selection problem entailed; nevertheless they point to
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the absence of any negative effect of the policy in terms of educational achievements.
2.8 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzed the effects of an expansion of tertiary education supply on schooling
decisions of high school graduates. The idea is that the provision of local educational
facilities can represent a major cut to the individual cost of attending tertiary education
and thus generate an increase in the rates of enrollment to university of high school grad-
uates. This is of particular relevance in Italy, where tertiary enrollment rates are below
the OECD average and the value of tertiary human capital is the lowest among OECD
countries (Martins et al., 2007; OECD, 2010).
A Difference in Difference estimation strategy was employed to compare the schooling
decisions of high school graduates between provinces which, following to the reform of
1999, experienced a significant increase of tertiary education supply, and those where this
change was negligible. The two main outcomes analyzed are the decision of enrolling to
university at all and that of enrolling to the local university rather than to one that is
farther away. While the first probability was estimated via a DD probit, the second re-
quired a two-step Heckman estimation to account for sample selection (i.e. only those who
did enroll to university are observed in their choice of attending university locally or away).
This analysis has been implemented in a gender perspective, believing that the cost
of moving away from home might be different for boys and girls. Indeed the finding that
the provision of local tertiary education generated an increase in the number of girls that
enrolled to university whereas boys tended to substitute education away from home with
local education, confirms the idea that girls are faced with a higher cost of moving away
from home and that thus the lack of local educational facilities leaves a significant frac-
tion of them out of education. A crucial consequence of this finding further relates to
the quality of females’ education: given the extra constraints they face when taking their
schooling decisions, they are likely to end up attending higher education institutions of
relatively lower quality than those attended by their male peers.
74
This work also suggested that the most relevant constraint to girls’ mobility (and thus
schooling) is a non financial one, as girls coming from more aﬄuent families were more
likely to switch from attending college in a province different from that of residence to
attend the local college. Moreover, evidence was provided that the effect of the reform on
female enrollment rates was larger in areas where women are reported to dedicate more
of their time to family care.
Some caveats need to be pointed out: spillover effects between treated and control ar-
eas cannot be ruled out. Still, their existence would imply that people in control provinces
should respond to the treatment of the other provinces; so for example students living in a
control province but on the border with a treated province might respond to the increase
in educational supply in the treated province by switching from not enrolling to college
to enrolling, vice versa, those living in a treated province but close to a control province
university, may attend college anyway. Then, if either of these was the case, the difference
between treatment and control areas would be underestimated and thus the estimated
treatment effect would be a lower bound of the actual effect of the reform. With respect
to mobility decisions, on the other hand, it is very unlikely that students from the control
provinces moved to the treatment provinces in response to the increased supply of tertiary
education in the latter because the difference between treatment and control provinces in
terms of educational supply and quality of institutions remained very large despite the
reform.
A second caveat concerns the possibility of general equilibrium effects that might lower
the returns to tertiary education: if more people attend higher education this is likely to
lower the expected returns from such choice. If the reference labor market was the same
for both treated and control provinces this would not be an issue. If instead the reference
labor market is local, which is plausible, then again the actual effect of the reform would
be mitigated by the anticipated counterbalancing general equilibrium effects. The study
by Bosio and Leonardi (2010) reassures us on this respect. They show that the reform
increased the probability of employment of young graduates with a larger effect on men
than on women. If they were anticipating general equilibrium effects, women should then
have increased their enrollments less than boys. Moreover the same authors find a wage
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penalty for young graduates after the reform as would be predicted by a general equilib-
rium model, but this was again larger for girls than for boys.
To conclude, while the results obtained in this paper clearly have limited external
validity, this work provides a valuable tool of policy evaluation for its internal validity :
the most recent educational reforms in Italy are aiming at a more “efficient” use of the
financial resources, which should entail a strong centralization of the tertiary educational
system and the dismissal of all small satellite campuses. This work showed that such an
intervention, if not coupled with other instruments that can increase women’s propensity
to move, would leave a large slice of the female population out of the educational system,
given that there exist significant differences in the perceived cost of moving away from
home between men and women.
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2.9 Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics by Variety Treatment
- 1998 Graduates - - 2004 Graduates -
Control Treatment C-T Control Treatment C-T DD
Female 0.529 0.544 -0.015 0.512 0.520 -0.008 0.007
(0.499) (0.498) (0.500) (0.500)
Liceo 0.296 0.293 0.003 0.315 0.280 0.035 0.032
(0.457) (0.455) (0.465) (0.449)
Grade High School 75.44 75.28 0.16 78.24 77.88 0.36 0.2
(12.00) (11.69) (13.16) (13.06)
Father has college degree 0.0976 0.0810 0.0166 0.119 0.0948 0.0242** 0.0076
(0.297) (0.273) (0.324) (0.293)
Mother has college degree 0.0833 0.0582 0.0251*** 0.102 0.0885 0.0135 -0.0116
(0.276) (0.234) (0.303) (0.284)
Father manager 0.147 0.135 0.012 0.147 0.134 0.013 0.001
(0.354) (0.342) (0.354) (0.340)
Mother manager 0.0545 0.0645 -0.01 0.0533 0.0467 0.0066 0.0166
(0.227) (0.246) (0.225) (0.211)
Mother housewife 0.564 0.559 0.005 0.489 0.492 -0.003 -0.008
(0.496) (0.497) (0.500) (0.500)
Number of Colleges 2.016 1.439 0.577*** 2.145 1.805 0.34 -0.237
(1.577) (0.803) (1.756) (1.071)
Employability Premium 5.811 7.766 -1.955* 3.068 4.233 -1.165 0.79
(7.969) (6.750) (5.560) (7.538)
Unemployment Rate 30.82 32.09 -1.27 23.42 25.06 -1.64 -0.37
(20.85) (21.09) (14.07) (16.19)
log GDP per capita∗ 9.714 9.649 0.065* 9.931 9.868 0.063* -0.002
(0.283) (0.266) (0.256) (0.260)
Standard Deviations in parentheses. Standard Errors of estimated differences clustered at province level in
upper panel.
∗ Source: Istat (2010b).
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Table 2.2: Rates of Enrollment within same year of high school graduation
1998 Graduates 2001 Graduates 2004 Graduates
Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total
North-West 36.52 40.00 38.37 37.39 44.78 41.32 41.13 56.32 49.14
North-East 32.25 37.34 34.96 39.81 43.11 41.58 42.76 53.66 48.56
Centre 40.79 44.07 42.56 40.62 50.74 45.85 41.74 54.44 48.21
South 37.30 44.37 41.01 39.27 52.08 45.73 36.82 55.45 46.06
Islands 34.06 39.85 37.19 36.29 46.66 41.66 36.16 52.88 44.85
Italy 36.62 41.70 39.33 38.83 48.10 43.64 39.42 54.79 47.32
Table 2.3: Regional Mobility Rates by Gender and Geographical Area
Attended University
in a region different from that of high school
1998 Graduates 2001 Graduates 2004 Graduates
Males Females M-F Males Females M-F Males Females M-F
North-West 15.16 14.07 1.09 9.95 11.15 -1.2 11.21 15.32 -4.11***
North-East 19.45 18.07 1.38 16.35 15.99 0.36 18.5 17.44 1.06
Centre 15.21 7.56 7.65*** 13.3 11.19 2.11 12.41 12.91 -0.5
South 21.8 17.83 3.97*** 24.62 24.09 0.53 24.64 24.84 -0.2
Islands 8.51 8.46 0.05 16.15 10.9 5.25** 14.96 8.52 6.44***
Total 17.08 13.73 3.35*** 16.95 15.9 1.05*** 17.07 17.12 -0.05
Table 2.4: Inter-province Mobility Rates by Gender and Geographical Area
Attended University
in a province different from that of high school
1998 Graduates 2001 Graduates 2004 Graduates
Males Females M-F Males Females M-F Males Females M-F
North-West 40.58 40.74 -0.16 46.33 41.07 5.26** 42.85 46.97 -4.12**
North-East 66.11 61.62 4.49 53.33 55.84 -2.51 57.77 61.86 -4.09***
Centre 41.89 36.58 5.31** 37.38 43.14 -5.76*** 44.43 41.9 2.53
South 48.19 45.09 3.10 48.87 50.65 -1.78 46.91 48.06 -1.15***
Islands 35.98 39.96 -3.98 46.31 39.91 6.4** 40.3 42.88 -2.58
Total 46.29 44.01 2.28** 46.47 46.53 -0.06 46.26 47.95 -1.69**
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Table 2.5: Individual characteristics by enrollment and mobility status
Enrolment Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Liceo 0.527*** -0.0115
(0.00857) (0.0240)
Father Manager 0.0178* -0.0102
(0.0105) (0.0210)
Mother Manager 0.0450* -0.00444
(0.0268) (0.0293)
Observations 69,332 47,643 22,810 31,741 22,215 11,149
R-squared 0.245 0.007 0.009 0.000 0.002 0.001
Year Fixed Effects included.
Robust standard errors clusterd at province level in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Determinants of the probability of enrollment and mobility.
Table 2.6: Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied. Probit difference-in-
differences estimation.
Probability of Enrollment Within Same Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Tp × Postt 0.055* 0.026 0.078*** 0.042* 0.011 0.062**
(0.028) (0.040) (0.029) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026)
Postt 0.034*** 0.000 0.069*** 0.186*** 0.198*** 0.157**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.056) (0.057) (0.065)
Tp -0.025 -0.010 -0.040
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes
Observations 48,248 22,112 26,136 48,248 22,112 26,136
Pseudo R2 0.310 0.331 0.287 0.316 0.341 0.297
Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Controls: Type of High School, Grade High School, Father’s and Mother’s
Education, Mother Housewife, Number of Universities in Province, log GDP in
Province, Employability Premium for College Graduates, Youth
Unemployment Rate.
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Table 2.7: Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied. Probit difference-in-
differences estimation.
Probability of Attending University
in a Province different from that of High School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Tp × Postt -0.028 -0.060 -0.013 -0.039 -0.077** -0.025
(0.029) (0.037) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.038)
Postt 0.253** 0.276** 0.259** 0.048 -0.011 0.063*
(0.100) (0.119) (0.113) (0.035) (0.060) (0.037)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values∗ ∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 18,592 7,396 11,196 18,592 7,396 11,196
Pseudo R2 0.330 0.333 0.340 0.329 0.332 0.339
Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Controls: Type of High School, Grade High School, Father’s and Mother’s Education,
Mother Housewife, Number of Universities in Province, log GDP in Province,
Employability Premium for College Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate.
∗∗ Labor Market Controls, Absolute Values: log GDP in Province, Employability
Premium for College Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate;
Relative values: difference to highest quartile.
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Table 2.8: Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied. Heckman 2-Step difference-
in-differences estimation.
Probability of Attending University
in a Province different from that of High School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Tp × Postt -0.013 -0.032 -0.006 -0.017 -0.043* -0.011
(0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.022)
Postt 0.113** 0.127** 0.111** 0.020 -0.021 0.030*
(0.047) (0.059) (0.051) (0.018) (0.035) (0.018)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values∗∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 47,107 21,588 25,519 47,107 21,588 25,519
Wald test of indep. eqns. (ρ = 0) 16.83 10.81 10.90 16.19 9.901 10.96
Prob > χ2∗ ∗ ∗ 4.10e-05 0.00101 0.000963 5.74e-05 0.00165 0.000930
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Controls: Grade High School, Father’s and Mother’s Education, Mother Housewife, Number of
Universities in Province.
∗∗ Labor Market Controls, Absolute Values: log GDP in Province, Employability Premium for
College Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate;
Relative values: difference to highest quartile.
∗ ∗ ∗ Excluded variable: type of high school attended is Liceo.
Table 2.9: Correlation Coefficients
Mother Mother with Father Father
Housewife College Degree Manager Blue Collar
Mother Housewife 1
Mother with College Degree -0.2135* 1
Father Manager -0.0138* 0.002 1
Father Blue Collar 0.0245* -0.0036 -0.4061* 1
∗ Statistically Significant at 1% level.
81
Table 2.10: The mechanisms: Enrollment Decisions. Probit difference-in-differences estima-
tion.
Probability of Enrollment
Within Same Year
(1) (2) (3)
All Males Females
Tp × Postt 0.025 -0.017 0.053*
(0.025) (0.037) (0.031)
Postt 0.212*** 0.229*** 0.166**
(0.060) (0.062) (0.073)
Father Manager ×Tp × Postt 0.056 0.142 -0.018
(0.054) (0.094) (0.074)
Father Manager ×Postt 0.007 -0.043 0.047
(0.032) (0.050) (0.036)
Father Manager ×Tp -0.075* -0.142** -0.003
(0.044) (0.060) (0.062)
Father Manager 0.019 0.051 -0.006
(0.028) (0.049) (0.032)
Mother with College degree ×Tp × Postt 0.117 0.097 0.143
(0.092) (0.160) (0.119)
Mother with College degree ×Postt -0.109*** -0.091** -0.117*
(0.040) (0.038) (0.063)
Mother with College degree ×Tp -0.052 -0.015 -0.094
(0.073) (0.139) (0.086)
Mother with College degree 0.209*** 0.184*** 0.222***
(0.034) (0.047) (0.034)
Controls∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes
Observations 47,099 21,529 25,570
Pseudo R2 0.306 0.329 0.288
Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
Controls and Province Fixed Effects included.
∗ Controls: Type of High School, Grade High School, Number of Universities
in Province, log GDP in Province, Employability Premium for College
Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate.
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Table 2.11: The mechanisms: Mobility Decisions. Heckman 2-Step difference-in-differences
estimation.
Probability of Attending University
in a Province different from that of High School
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Tp × Postt 0.001 -0.028 0.012 -0.003 -0.040 0.007
(0.021) (0.031) (0.029) (0.022) (0.033) (0.028)
Postt 0.105** 0.113* 0.109** 0.016 -0.035 0.030*
(0.048) (0.059) (0.051) (0.019) (0.036) (0.018)
Father Manager ×Tp × Postt -0.084** -0.032 -0.109*** -0.082** -0.030 -0.110***
(0.040) (0.085) (0.039) (0.041) (0.086) (0.039)
Father Manager ×Postt 0.031 0.026 0.030 0.031 0.026 0.030
(0.034) (0.067) (0.022) (0.033) (0.067) (0.022)
Father Manager ×Tp 0.112*** 0.082 0.120*** 0.111*** 0.081 0.121***
(0.037) (0.079) (0.039) (0.037) (0.079) (0.039)
Father Manager -0.021 -0.033 -0.009 -0.021 -0.033 -0.010
(0.031) (0.064) (0.019) (0.031) (0.064) (0.019)
Mother with College degree ×Tp × Postt -0.024 -0.007 -0.034 -0.023 -0.006 -0.032
(0.046) (0.073) (0.048) (0.045) (0.072) (0.048)
Mother with College degree ×Postt 0.013 0.051* -0.018 0.013 0.050 -0.018
(0.016) (0.031) (0.022) (0.016) (0.031) (0.022)
Mother with College degree ×Tp 0.036 -0.014 0.080** 0.035 -0.015 0.077*
(0.039) (0.058) (0.041) (0.039) (0.058) (0.040)
Mother with College degree 0.003 -0.008 0.013 0.004 -0.007 0.013
(0.019) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.019)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values∗∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 46,500 21,315 25,185 46,500 21,315 25,185
Wald test of indep. eqns. (ρ = 0) 16.19 9.739 12.70 15.73 8.780 12.81
Prob > χ2∗ ∗ ∗ 5.73e-05 0.00180 0.000365 7.31e-05 0.00305 0.000345
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Controls: Grade High School, Number of Universities in Province.
∗∗ Labor Market Controls, Absolute Values: log GDP in Province, Employability Premium for College
Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate;
Relative values: difference to highest quartile.
∗ ∗ ∗ Excluded variable: type of high school attended is Liceo.
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Table 2.12: Placebo Test: Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied between
1995 and 1999. Probit difference-in-differences estimation.
Probability of Enrollment Within Same Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Tp × Postt 0.003 -0.007 0.011 0.006 -0.005 0.017
(0.021) (0.033) (0.024) (0.021) (0.035) (0.025)
Postt -0.030** -0.022 -0.034** -0.055 -0.094 -0.014
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.047) (0.064) (0.069)
Tp -0.027* -0.009 -0.045**
(0.016) (0.020) (0.020)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes
Observations 40,639 18,406 22,233 40,639 18,396 22,233
Pseudo R2 0.337 0.363 0.315 0.343 0.372 0.326
Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Controls: Type of High School, Grade High School, Father’s and Mother’s
Education, Mother Housewife, log GDP in Province, Employability
Premium for College Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate.
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Table 2.13: Placebo Test. Effect of the increase in the variety of courses supplied between
1995 and 1999.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
A. Probability of Attending University away from home - Probit
Tp × Postt -0.060 -0.060 -0.048 -0.114*** -0.122*** -0.110***
(0.048) (0.073) (0.051) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041)
Postt 0.083** 0.104** 0.087** -0.038 -0.015 -0.027
(0.038) (0.049) (0.037) (0.034) (0.047) (0.044)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values∗ ∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 15,210 5,997 9,213 12,706 4,910 7,746
Pseudo R2 0.227 0.252 0.224 0.383 0.399 0.383
B. Probability of Attending University away from home - Heckman
Tp × Postt -0.054** -0.051* -0.052* -0.061** -0.059** -0.055*
(0.024) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.028) (0.029)
Postt 0.005 -0.023 0.027 -0.018 -0.011 -0.026
(0.045) (0.058) (0.054) (0.018) (0.025) (0.024)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values∗ ∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 39,833 18,076 21,757 39,833 18,076 21,757
Wald test of indep. eqns. (ρ = 0) 15.25 10.73 8.360 15.18 11.55 8.290
Prob > χ2 9.43e-05 0.00106 0.00384 9.75e-05 0.000677 0.00399
For Probit Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Controls: Type of High School, Grade High School, Father’s and Mother’s Education, Mother
Housewife, Number of Universities in Province.
∗∗ Labor Market Controls, Absolute Values: log GDP in Province, Employability Premium for College
Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate;
Relative values: difference to highest quartile.
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Table 2.14: Instrumental Variables Estimates
Enrollment Mobility†
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Tp 0.016 -0.020 0.045 0.407* 0.278 0.476*
(0.034) (0.049) (0.032) (0.241) (0.226) (0.262)
Controls∗ yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values∗∗ yes yes yes
Province F.E. no no no no no no
Observations 25,880 11,841 14,039 15,009 6,079 8,930
R2 0.342 0.347 0.321 0.239 0.261 0.232
F Statistic of excluded instrument 7.607 8.247 6.731 6.621 6.665 6.105
p-value 0.0069 0.005 0.0109 0.0115 0.0113 0.0151
First Stage
Elections in 2001 or 2002 0.379*** 0.393*** 0.360** 0.376*** 0.392*** 0.353**
(0.137) (0.137) (0.139) (0.137) (0.137) (0.139)
R2 0.149 0.152 0.157 0.148 0.151 0.155
Sample is only 2004 high school graduates.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
† IV estimation combined with Heckman selection.
∗ Controls: Type of High School, Grade High School, Father’s and Mother’s Education, Mother
Housewife, Number of Universities in Province.
∗∗ Labor Market Controls, Absolute Values: log GDP in Province, Employability Premium for College
Graduates, Youth Unemployment Rate;
Relative values: difference to highest quartile.
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Table 2.15: Robustness Checks: Excluding Big Cities. ATET.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
A. Probability of Enroling to University within same year - Probit
Tp × Postt 0.053* 0.024 0.075*** 0.041* 0.012 0.062**
(0.027) (0.039) (0.028) (0.023) (0.036) (0.026)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 42,349 19,481 22,868 42,349 19,481 22,868
Pseudo R2 0.307 0.325 0.286 0.313 0.336 0.297
B. Probability of Attending University away from home - Probit
Tp × Postt -0.003 -0.038 0.013 -0.017 -0.058 0.003
(0.036) (0.045) (0.049) (0.032) (0.039) (0.045)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 15,814 6,291 9,523 15,814 6,291 9,523
Pseudo R2 0.304 0.301 0.321 0.303 0.300 0.320
C. Probability of Attending University away from home - Heckman
Tp × Postt -0.001 -0.018 0.002 -0.004 -0.026 -0.000
(0.017) (0.027) (0.025) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025)
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
absolute values yes yes yes
Labor Market Controls,
relative values yes yes yes
Province F.E. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 41,296 18,990 22,306 41,296 18,990 22,306
Wald test of indep. eqns. (ρ = 0) 16.70 10.78 8.833 15.77 10.03 8.663
Prob > χ2 4.37e-05 0.00103 0.00296 7.16e-05 0.00154 0.00325
For Probit Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
87
Table 2.16: Sensitivity to threshold. Enrollment Decisions. Probit difference-in-differences
estimation. ATET.
Probability of Enrollment within same year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Breakpoint at Median 0.010 -0.021 0.032 0.030 0.002 0.058**
(0.020) (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.028) (0.023)
Breakpoint at 63rd percentile∗ 0.055* 0.026 0.078*** 0.042* 0.011 0.062**
(0.028) (0.040) (0.029) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026)
Breakpoint at 75th percentile 0.036** 0.002 0.056*** 0.038 -0.009 0.077**
(0.017) (0.027) (0.021) (0.029) (0.045) (0.031)
Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Treatment dummies included in columns (1)-(3), province fixed effects in columns (4)-(6).
Standard errors robust to province level clustering in parentheses.
∗ Breakpoint at 63rd percentile is the main definition of treatment as in Table 2.6.
Table 2.17: Sensitivity to threshold. Mobility Decisions. ATET.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
A. Probability of Attending University away from home - Probit
Breakpoint at Median -0.016 -0.069* 0.025 -0.019 -0.076** 0.019
(0.030) (0.040) (0.039) (0.031) (0.038) (0.040)
Breakpoint at 63rd percentile∗ -0.028 -0.060 -0.013 -0.039 -0.077** -0.025
(0.029) (0.037) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.038)
Breakpoint at 75th percentile -0.010 -0.055 0.003 -0.047 -0.097*** -0.027
(0.039) (0.045) (0.046) (0.031) (0.030) (0.042)
B. Probability of Attending University away from home - Heckman
Breakpoint at Median -0.005 -0.047 0.026 -0.011 -0.060* 0.019
(0.019) (0.030) (0.025) (0.018) (0.030) (0.024)
Breakpoint at 63rd percentile∗ -0.013 -0.032 -0.006 -0.017 -0.043* -0.011
(0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.022)
Breakpoint at 75th percentile -0.012 -0.033 -0.008 -0.020 -0.049* -0.015
(0.016) (0.026) (0.021) (0.016) (0.026) (0.022)
For Probit Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
∗ Breakpoint at 63rd percentile is the main definition of treatment as in Tables 2.7 and 2.8.
88
Table 2.18: Results under different definitions of Treatment. Probit difference-in-differences
estimation. ATET.
Enrollment within three years Enrollment within same year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Variety Treatment 0.055* 0.026 0.078*** 0.042* 0.011 0.062**
(0.028) (0.040) (0.029) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026)
Universities Treatment -0.000 -0.010 0.002 0.085* 0.035 0.117**
(0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.044) (0.059) (0.046)
Departments Treatment 0.090*** 0.091* 0.092*** 0.081*** 0.081* 0.079**
(0.034) (0.047) (0.035) (0.031) (0.046) (0.036)
Degrees Treatment -0.021 -0.018 -0.022 -0.028 -0.018 -0.038
(0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
Controls and Province fixed effects included in all regressions.
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Table 2.19: Results under different definitions of Treatment. ATET.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
A. Probability of Attending University away from home - Probit
Variety Treatment -0.028 -0.059 -0.013 -0.039 -0.077** -0.026
(0.030) (0.037) (0.040) (0.027) (0.032) (0.038)
Universities Treatment 0.018 -0.059 0.063 0.002 -0.095 0.042
(0.062) (0.086) (0.082) (0.061) (0.085) (0.075)
Departments Treatment -0.014 -0.061 0.016 0.000 -0.059 0.013
(0.031) (0.042) (0.040) (0.034) (0.048) (0.046)
Degrees Treatment -0.025 -0.036 -0.031 -0.031 -0.052 -0.040
(0.034) (0.054) (0.046) (0.034) (0.059) (0.046)
B. Probability of Attending University away from home - Heckman
Variety Treatment -0.013 -0.032 -0.006 -0.017 -0.043* -0.011
(0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (0.016) (0.025) (0.022)
Universities Treatment 0.003 -0.063 0.041 -0.001 -0.082 0.032
(0.038) (0.065) (0.051) (0.039) (0.069) (0.050)
Departments Treatment 0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.008 -0.004
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019)
Degrees Treatment -0.010 -0.019 -0.010 -0.012 -0.024 -0.013
(0.020) (0.033) (0.027) (0.020) (0.035) (0.027)
For Probit Estimated Marginal Effects at the mean reported.
Standard Errors Robust to Province Clustering in parentheses.
Controls included; Labor Market Controls: Absolute Values in columns (1)-(3) and
Relative Values in columns (4)-(6).
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Table 2.20: Educational Achievements. ATET.
No Province F.E. With Province F.E.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Males Females All Males Females
Drop Out -0.016 -0.027 -0.006 -0.013 -0.017 0.003
(0.015) (0.018) (0.021) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Attendance 0.007 -0.021 0.031* 0.004 -0.006 0.027
(0.017) (0.028) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.018)
Number of Exams 0.525 0.749 0.205 -0.225 0.239 -1.046
(0.650) (0.623) (0.833) (0.440) (0.451) (0.680)
Drop Out, Attendance: Probit Estimates, marginal effects at the mean
reported. Number of Exams: Ordered Probit Estimates.
Sample includes only students who enrolled immediately after high school
degree.
Standard Errors robust to province clustering in parenthesis.
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2.10 Appendices
2.10.1 Labor Market Characteristics
Figure 2.7: Employment Rates by gender and educational attainment. Source: Istat, Labour
Force Survey, 2004.
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2.10.2 Partition of Provinces
Table 2.21: Treated Provinces according to different definitions of treatment.
Variety Departments Universities Degrees
Agrigento Varese Ascoli Piceno Aosta Agrigento Padova
Aosta Verbania Asti Arezzo Alessandria Palermo
Ascoli Piceno Vercelli Avellino Ascoli Piceno Aosta Parma
Asti Vicenza Bergamo Asti Ascoli Piceno Perugia
Avellino Bolzano/Bozen Avellino Asti Pesaro e Urbino
Bergamo Brindisi Benevento Avellino Pescara
Bolzano/Bozen Campobasso Bergamo Bari Piacenza
Brindisi Chieti Biella Belluno Pistoia
Caltanissetta Cuneo Bologna Bergamo Potenza
Campobasso Enna Bolzano/Bozen Bologna Prato
Catanzaro Grosseto Campobasso Bolzano/Bozen Ragusa
Como Livorno Chieti Brescia Ravenna
Cuneo Lodi Cuneo Brindisi Reggio di Calabria
Enna Massa-Carrara Enna Cagliari Reggio nell’Emilia
Foggia Pistoia L’Aquila Campobasso Rimini
Grosseto Prato La Spezia Caserta Roma
L’Aquila Ragusa Lecce Chieti Rovigo
Livorno Rimini Lodi Como Sassari
Lodi Rovigo Matera Cosenza Siena
Massa-Carrara Sondrio Pesaro e Urbino Cremona Siracusa
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Chapter 3
When the cat’s away...
The effects of spousal migration
on investments on children
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of parental migration on children left behind in order to
understand whether and how the effects of migration on children depend on which of their
parents migrates. I describe the migration of one of the spouses as a sequential game in
which the spouse who migrated chooses how much to send back to the spouse left behind
in the form of remittances and then the latter decides how to allocate her total available
budget within the household. A similar mechanism generates no difference in the share of
total household income devoted to investment on children no matter which of the parents
migrates, even when the two spouses have different preferences. These predictions are
tested using data from Indonesia, where female migration is particularly widespread.
To solve the selection problems entailed in the comparison between households with mi-
grant fathers and households with migrant mothers, I focus on households that have at
least one migrant parent and develop a model in which the decision about whether to send
the man or the woman eventually depends on the expected returns and risk associated
to each of the two choices. These measures will provide me with a set of instrumental
variables to test the theoretical model.
In accordance with the predictions of the model I find that the difference in children
related expenditure is not significant between households in which mothers migrate and
households in which fathers do. On the other hand I find that in households with migrant
mother a significantly larger share of income is devoted to adult goods consumption;this
difference reflects the difference in tastes for investment on children between men and
women.
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3.1 Introduction
In a context of global increase of international migration of workers, a relatively more
recent phenomenon is represented by the sharp increase in female independent migration.
This phenomenon, sometimes referred to as feminization of migration, regards the migra-
tion of female workers on their own without their families.
The most significant flows of female migrants are probably those of women from less de-
veloped countries who migrate to more developed ones to work as domestic workers and
remain in the destination country for a few years before going back to their country of
origin and rejoin their families. Scholars have suggestively labeled such phenomenon as
“the servants of globalization” (Parrenas, 2001) or “the global nanny chain” (Lan, 2006)
or “the globalization of household production” (Kremer and Watt, 2006).
Because the phenomenon is relatively recent and because these migrants often elude the
official patterns and thus do not appear on the records, the economic literature has so
far given them little attention. Nevertheless the everyday experience shows how massive
some of these flows are: the Romanian women migrating to western European countries,
those coming from the Philippines and Indonesia, as well as those migrating to the US
from Latin America or even those migrating within Latin America such as the Peruvians
to Chile.
While some studies have looked at the impact of migrant inflows on the destination coun-
tries’ labor markets (Card, 1990; Altonji and Card, 1991; Borjas, 1994, 1999; Kremer and
Watt, 2006), considerably fewer have analyzed the impact of such phenomena on the send-
ing country and on the households of origin.
The present work aims at analyzing the differential effects of parental migration on
investments on children depending on whether it is the mother of the child that leaves or
the father. Several studies have showed that women have stronger preferences for investing
on children than men (Duflo, 2001; Thomas, 1990; Qian, 2008). Therefore the change in
the structure of the household that is caused by migration is likely to have different effects
depending on who migrates (see Chen (2009) on migration, but also a similar reasoning
applies to the paper by Gertler et al. (2004)). Understanding whether and how migration
of the father or of the mother differently affects the children left behind can have important
policy implications: for instance it can help governments as well as non governmental or-
ganizations decide about how to target financial and non financial support to the families
of migrants,1 or provide useful insights for the regulation of migration both in sending and
1UNICEF, for example, promotes policy research on migration and children left behind with a special
focus on gender issues
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receiving countries; indeed while receiving countries increasingly adopt policies that allow
the immigration of female domestic workers from developing countries to face the aging
of their population and to encourage the labor force participation of the local women,2
sending countries are starting to perceive the dangers entailed by the massive outflows of
local women and react by putting legal limits to emigration, the most impressive example
being that of Sri Lanka, which in 2008 passed a law to ban the international migration of
mothers of children under the age of five.
The existing literature has prominently used the existence and the structure of mi-
grants’ networks to predict migration decisions (Bansak and Chezum, 2009; Hanson and
Woodruff, 2003; Hildebrandt and McKenzie, 2005; Mansuri, 2006) and thus retrieve the
effects of parental migration on the household left behind.
Much less numerous are then the contributions of the literature to the choice of female
migration; to the best of my knowledge there currently are only two: Lauby and Stark
(1988) and de la Brie´re et al. (2002). Both suggest that female migration would be a
means to provide the family left behind with a more stable and reliable source of income
than what would be in case of male migration, this because the jobs chosen by migrant
women are typically less risky than those chosen by men (Lauby and Stark, 1988) and
because women are intrinsically more attached to the family left behind and thus send
more remittances (de la Brie´re et al., 2002).
I will build on this literature to design a model where female migration arises when-
ever the income for women at destination is either higher or less volatile than that of men
and where the consequent allocation of resources will take into account the difference in
preferences between men and women over investment on children.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 describes the model of migration choice
and of intra-household allocation of resources of the household; section 3.3 introduces the
data employed; section 3.4 is dedicated to the identification and estimation strategy; sec-
tion 3.5 shows the estimation results; finally section 3.6 provides some robustness checks
and section 3.7 concludes.
2Similar policies are for instance in place in Hong Kong and Singapore, as analyzed in Kremer and
Watt (2006)
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3.2 A model of household migration choice
3.2.1 The choice of the migrant
I model the migration choices of the household building on the intuition given by Lauby
and Stark (1988) for whom female migration would represent a safer investment than
male migration for the twofold reason that women are more reliable in sending back re-
mittances, because they are typically more attached to the household of origin, and that
the jobs that women get upon migration usually provide more stable streams of income.
In this setting, I will imagine that a rational, utility optimizing, risk averse household is
faced with a risky source of income and thus decides to gain control of this risk through
the diversification of its income sources. I assume that such diversification will take place
through the placement of the “best suited” member of the household in a different location
where income streams are not correlated with those at the original location.
I further rely on the assumption that the household decides who migrates but does not
decide where the migrant will go, I will only assume that men and women would migrate
to different places. Although it might be interesting to also model the decision of where to
go, it is widely documented that migrants tend to show very little variation in the choice
of their destinations, following instead quite stable patterns of migration from one place
to the other.
What the household has to decide is who to send away between the two spouses,
given the assigned gender-specific destination. To model this decision I will borrow the
terminology of Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz, 1952): I imagine therefore that
“woman migrates” and “man migrates” are two risky assets that can each be coupled with
another risky asset which consists in “man stays” and “woman stays”. The combination
of such assets therefore generates four types of portfolios:
1. Man migrates and woman stays
2. Woman migrates and man stays
3. Both spouses stay in their original location
4. Both spouses migrate to an alternative location
What I want to model is the choice of the household between portfolio 1 and portfolio 2.
As in Modern Portfolio Theory, I assume that each asset’s returns are normally dis-
tributed and define risk as the standard deviation of return. A portfolio will thus be a
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linear combination of assets.
Therefore the returns associated to each migration portfolio will be a weighted average3 of
the constituent assets’ returns, while portfolio risk (volatility) will be a linear combination
of each component asset’s own volatility and their covariance.
The expected returns of portfolios 1 (man migrates and woman stays) and 2 (woman
migrates and man stays)4 are thus:
E(Rm) =
1
2
E(wdm) +
1
2
E(whf )
E(Rf ) =
1
2
E(wdf ) +
1
2
E(whm)
(3.1)
where E(wdm) represents expected wages for men upon migration (at destination) and
E(whf ) the expected wages for women if they do not migrate (at home); symmetrically
then E(wdf ) are expected wages for women upon migration and E(w
h
m) the expected wages
for men if they do not migrate.
The risk associated to the two portfolios will instead be:
σ2m =
1
4
V ar(whf ) +
1
4
V ar(wdm) +
1
2
Cov(wdm, w
h
f )
σ2f =
1
4
V ar(whm) +
1
4
V ar(wdf ) +
1
2
Cov(wdf , w
h
m)
(3.2)
I assume that the household’s utility is increasing in the expected returns of the port-
folio chosen and decreasing in the associated risk. I also consider that household’s degree
of risk aversion (βh) will amplify their taste for risk and in some cases determine which
one is the preferred portfolio.
Indeed, let’s consider the case in which:
1. E(wdm) > E(w
d
f ): Men earn on average more than women at destination;
2. V ar(wdm) > V ar(w
d
f ): Men’s income is more volatile than women’s upon migration.
Under such conditions we get that portfolio 1 (man migrates and woman stays) entails
higher expected returns , but also higher risk, than portfolio 2 (Figure 3.1).
3Given the particular nature of the problem we are examining in which the only possible diversification
is to allocate the two spouses to different sources of income the weights assigned to the two component
assets will necessarily be 1/2 and 1/2
4I will denote portfolio 1 (man migrates and woman stays) by subscript m to indicate that it is the
man that migrates whereas I will use subscript f for portfolio 2 to indicate that it is the female spouse
who migrates.
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Figure 3.1: Returns-Risk Profiles of Migration Portfolios
In Figure 3.1 the red indifference curves are those of a more risk averse household
whereas the blue ones are those of a less risk averse one. The graph shows that in a simi-
lar case more risk averse households (red indifference curves) will prefer female migration
(portfolio 2) whereas less risk averse households (blue indifference curves) will prefer male
migration (portfolio 1).
The maximization problem faced by the household will thus be that of maximizing ex-
pected returns holding risk fixed and minimizing risk holding expected returns fixed.
3.2.2 The allocation of resources within the household
Having decided together which member of the household should migrate so that the ex-
pected returns are maximized while risk is minimized, the spouses are faced with two types
of decisions: the migrant has to decide how much to remit to the household left behind,
while the spouse who stayed at home has to decide how to allocate resources within the
household. These two decisions are taken sequentially: first the migrant spouse decides
how much to remit; then the spouse left behind decides how to allocate his total available
budget, which will consist of his own income and the remittances received.
The household is composed of the two spouses who earn some positive income and
decide on the allocation of the household budget and by kids who do not earn any income
and do not participate in the decision making process. The man and the woman’s prefer-
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ences are such that each i gets utility from the consumption of some private good Xi and
from that of a common good Z which instead yields utility to both spouses.
Call Xf the vector of the woman’s private goods and Xm that of the man’s. We imag-
ine that Z, the vector of common goods, contains all children related expenditure, i.e.
both parents benefit from investment on children. However preferences are such that the
woman always weighs expenditure on children more than the man in her utility functions.5
Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences,6 I can express the preferences of men and women
in the following way:
Um = α logXm + (1− α) logZ
Uf = β logXf + (1− β) logZ
where the fact that men have a stronger preference for personal consumption over invest-
ment on children than women do is simply captured by imposing:
α > β (3.3)
With income pooling and equal weights assigned to the spouses, the utility maximiza-
tion problem the household wishes to solve when no migration occurs will be the following:
max
Xf ,Xm,Z
α logXm + (1− α) logZ + β logXf + (1− β) logZ
s.t. : Xm +Xf + Z = Ym + Yf
Which simply yields the following optimal allocations:7
X0m =
α
2
(Ym + Yf )
X0f =
β
2
(Ym + Yf )
Z0 =
(
1− α+ β
2
)
(Ym + Yf )
(3.4)
5The fact that women have stronger preferences for investing on children than men has been showed
in many papers among which Duflo (2001), Thomas (1990), Qian (2008).
6The results derived in this section are robust to any CES utility function specification.
7These are pareto-efficient (Chiappori and Donni, 2009).
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Suppose now that the woman migrates: she will have to decide how much to send back
in the form of remittances (R). Once the husband receives the remittances from his wife,
he decides how to spend the total budget available.
This non-cooperative Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium model can be solved through backward
induction: the husband decides how to allocate the budget available to him according to
his own preferences; the wife anticipates this allocation and incorporates the husband’s
choice in her decision problem to choose how much of her income to send back in remit-
tances.
The problem is thus a two-stage one where at the second stage the man solves:
max
Xm,Z
α logXm + (1− α) logZ
s.t. : Xm + Z = Ym +R
Solving this yields:
Z∗ = (1− α)(Ym +R)
X∗m = α(Ym +R)
(3.5)
In the first stage of the game the migrant wife anticipates the husband’s choice and
decides how much to send back through remittances by solving:
max
R
β logXf + (1− β) logZ
s.t. : Xf = Yf −R
Z = Z∗ = (1− α)(Ym +R)
She will hence choose to send remittances:
R∗ = Yf − β(Ym + Yf )
The equilibrium allocations of the sequential game described are therefore:
X∗m = α(1− β)(Ym + Yf )
X∗f = β(Ym + Yf )
Z∗ = (1− α)(1− β)(Ym + Yf )
(3.6)
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It is straightforward to solve the symmetric problem for the case in which it is the
husband that migrates and sends back remittances. In this case we would get the following
equilibrium allocations:
X∗∗m = α(Ym + Yf )
X∗∗f = β(1− α)(Ym + Yf )
Z∗∗ = (1− α)(1− β)(Ym + Yf )
(3.7)
with remittances sent by the husband being:
R∗∗ = Ym − α(Ym + Yf )
Because of the the ability of the migrant to anticipate the allocation that will be
chosen by the spouse left behind, the model predicts that the share of household income
devoted to children will be the same no matter which one of the spouses migrates. This
is because the non-migrant parent wants to shift away resources from children onto his
private consumption, but this can be offset by the migrant parent through remittances.
Denote with small letters the share of income devoted to each type of consumption goods,
we have:
z∗ = z∗∗
the share of total household income spent on expenditure on children will be the same no
matter which of the parents migrates (where z∗ = Z
∗
Ym+Yf
and z∗∗ = Z
∗∗
Ym+Yf
).
On the other hand, the person who migrates is always better off than the person left
behind whose level of private consumption will depend on the “generosity” of the migrant
spouse. For example a comparison between shares of total household income spent for
consumption of the husband’s private goods when he migrates and when instead it is the
wife who migrates shows that:
x∗∗m − x∗m = α− α(1− β) = αβ
which means that the “loss” that the non migrant spouse experiences is proportional to
the degree of “selfishness” of both himself and the migrant spouse (where x∗∗m =
X∗∗m
Ym+Yf
and x∗m =
X∗m
Ym+Yf
).
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It further appears that the spouse who migrates is always better off than when nobody
migrates, for example for men:
x∗∗m − x0m = α−
α
2
=
α
2
> 0
while the one left behind gains from migration of the spouse only when the latter is
“generous enough”; for example the man left behind gets a larger share of total household
income when his wife migrates compared to the case in which nobody migrates if β < 12 :
x∗m − x0m = α(1− β)−
α
2
> 0 for β <
1
2
Finally the share of income spent on children is always lower than in the case in
which both parents remain in the household: this is because the parent left behind will
always have an incentive to shift resources away from the children onto his own private
consumption whenever his spouse is away.
z0 > z∗, z∗∗ for any α, β
3.3 Data
This paper uses the data on Indonesian families provided by the Indonesia Family Life Sur-
vey (IFLS).8 The IFLS is an ongoing longitudinal survey of Indonesian households which
started in 1993 and contains a sample that is representative of about 83% of the total
Indonesian population, containing over 30,000 individuals living in 13 of the 27 provinces
of Indonesia.
These data give me the possibility of tracking individuals over time and thus to detect
migration. Indeed for all individuals who appeared in the first wave of the survey the IFLS
roster provides information on where they currently are (if they are not in the household
anymore), why and when they left and how much they earned in the past twelve months.
Using this information, I define migrants as those adult people who have left the household
and are reported to having done so for work reasons or explicitly to help the family. Table
3.1 shows that the share of migrants has steadily increased over time: from the time of the
first interview in 1993, fourteen years later more than one household out of four had at
least one member that had migrated (and not come back), while among all the individuals
8For an introduction to the dataset see Thomas et al. (2010)
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surveyed, migrants represented about 9%.
Table 3.1: Migration in the IFLS.
Wave Individuals Migrants % Households Migrant %
Households
1993 33,081 - - 7,224 - -
1997 39,714 1,701 4.28 7,699 1,304 16.94
2000 54,991 2,835 5.16 10,435 2,022 19.38
2007 73,016 6,352 8.70 13,536 3,787 27.98
Table 3.2, moreover, shows the gender partition of Indonesian migrants: almost two
thirds of migrants are men, but women are more than twice as likely as men to migrate
internationally and this is particularly true for mothers versus fathers. On the other hand
women, especially those who are mothers of children left behind, tend to stay away for a
period of time that is significantly shorter than that of men.
Table 3.2: Migrants by gender. IFLS 2007.
Number % of total % Migration
migrants international spell (months)
Migrants 6,352 - 11.04 64.93
Men 4,046 63.70 7.74 66.75
Fathers 840 13.22 7.63 69.81
Fathers of children
under 18 left behind 297 4.68 16.55 53.04
Women 2,306 36.30 16.99 61.72
Mothers 488 7.68 29.65 60.37
Mothers of children
under 18 left behind 191 3.01 60.32 39.44
I am interested in comparing households with children in which the mother migrated
and the father stayed with the children, with households in which the father migrated and
the mother stayed. Thus, for every child under the age of 18, I check whether his father
or mother migrated and assign the child to the relative group. Table 3.3 shows the actual
partition of households with children in the 2007 IFLS sample,9 while table 3.6 shows
9Notice that the total number of households with either a father or a mother that migrated leaving
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descriptive statistics for the two types of households of interest.
Table 3.3: Migration portfolio choices of households with kids. IFLS 2007.
Woman Woman
Migrates Stays
Man Migrates 40 258
Man Stays 152 9,186
Finally, data from the Indonesian Statistical Office (BPS, 2007) give a hint of what
jobs the Indonesian migrants perform when they migrate internationally. There is strik-
ingly little variation in the types of jobs of the Indonesian migrants at destination: 53%
of migrants who were abroad in 2007 worked as domestic helpers, while 42% as either
construction, factory or plantation workers.
Although I am not able to split such information by the gender of the migrant, I can still
see a difference between typical female jobs and typical male jobs: domestic workers are
very likely to be the female migrants, whose total percentage is in fact around 55% of total
international migrants, while the construction, factory and plantation workers are likely
to be the men.
3.4 Estimation Strategy
I want to estimate an equation in which I look at the shifts in the shares of total house-
hold expenditure from one category of consumption goods to another. A similar equation
represents the direct translation into estimation equation of the model introduced in sec-
tion 3.2.2. Indeed, we will think that there are some types of expenditure, such as that
for education or food, which well proxy for household’s investment on children (Z in the
model of section 3.2.2).
I will estimate an equation of the following type:
wih = αih + β lnn+ γFh + δXh + uih (3.8)
their children under the age of 18 behind is slightly smaller than the sum of migrant fathers and mothers
reported in table 3.2, because there are households that include more than one family unit.
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where on the left hand side I have the share of total household income allocated to expen-
diture for commodity i, and on the right hand side I have the number of members in the
household n together with household’s observable characteristics Xh, and a term Fh which
indicates that the household is one in which the mother of the children in the household
has migrated, while the father did not, Fh will be zero if instead it was the father who
migrated and the mother remained with the children.
The coefficient of interest is thus γ, associated to the term Fh; this will provide us with
a measure of the difference between the budget allocation of households with migrant
mothers and households with migrant fathers. Given that households belonging to the
two groups of interest do not differ with respect to their structure, it is possible to com-
pare them to retrieve the effects of migration of one of the spouses.
Estimating the effects of migration and how they differ depending on the gender of
the migrant spouse entails problems of endogenous selection into treatment of two types:
first there is a problem of selection into migration as households that decide to send some
member out for migration will likely differ from the others on both observable and un-
observable characteristics; secondly there is a problem of selection into female migration
because households from which it is the mother that migrates are likely to differ from
those from which the father migrates in a number of unobservable factors that might as
well influence the variables of outcome we are looking at.
These ideas are confirmed by Table 3.6, which shows that households with no migrants
are on average smaller, richer, more from urban areas, more educated and with younger
children than households from which either the mother or the father migrated. Moreover
households from which it is the mother that migrated appear to be more rural, less edu-
cated and poorer than those from which it is the father that migrated. It is therefore very
likely that these households differ on other unobservable characteristics as well.
This paper relies on the assumption that the decision of selection into migration and
that of selection into female migration are not taken jointly: the household decides whether
someone should migrate first and then decides which member.
With respect to the first choice, i.e. selection of households into migration, I will simply
condition on households having decided to send out a member for migration and focus on
the decision of which member should migrate.
This estimation choice, nevertheless, comes at a cost in terms of identification: indeed,
following this approach, I will not be able to separately estimate the effect of female ver-
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sus male migration from the effect of migration per se; in other words I will only identify
the effect of female migration in households in which either the woman or the man have
migrated but not in households in which no one has migrated.
Such identification issue, though, should not affect the reliability of my estimates because
there is no theoretical reason to expect migration of mothers from non migrant households
to have opposite effects than migration of mothers from migrant households; so, as long
as this assumption holds, the sign of the coefficients I estimate will be correct, although
the true parameters would be smaller in absolute value.
In order to control for selection into female migration, I will exploit the intuition of
the model described in section 3.2 and thus find a set of instrumental variables that may
influence the decision of migrant households about which of the spouses to send out for
migration but will not have any direct effect on the outcome variables of equation 3.8.
The model of section 3.2 is translated into the data by first assigning a destination to
each individual. To do so I identify for each household the year in which the migration
decision has been taken as that in which the migrant (whether the man or the woman)
has departed; I then look at the destinations chosen by the previous migrants from the
same village and take the destination that was most popular among female migrants as
destination for women and the one that was most popular among male migrants as desti-
nation for men.
This choice is justified by the finding that migrants from the same village tend to choose
the same destination (Table 3.4); this can be interpreted both as the consequence of the
formation of networks of migrants, which is also well documented in the migration litera-
ture (Bartel, 1989; Altonji and Card, 1991; Patel and Vella, 2007; Lafortune and Tessada,
2012), but also can be justified by the widespread use in South Asia of recruiting agencies
which are connected to other agencies in a foreign country and therefore tend to send
all the people of the village they visit to the same destination (Suradji, 2004). Table 3.8
shows the gender specific destinations assigned to each household.
Once I have assigned a destination to each household, I exploit again the information
about previous migrants. Thus I generate, for every destination and year of migration
decision, a measure of expected returns and risk by taking the mean and standard devia-
tion of the incomes of all male and female migrants that migrated to that destination, and
then I combine them as in equations 3.1 and 3.2. For what regards the covariance between
income at home and income at destination, instead, I exploit the longitudinal dimension
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Table 3.4: Migrants per village. IFLS 2007.
Men Women
Adults per village 55.31 58.70
[40.99] [42.29]
Migrants per village 15.64 9.39
[14.002] [9.185]
% Migrants at same destination .617 .622
[0.231] [0.234]
*Standard deviations reported in brackets
of the data, and compute the covariance for every village-destination pair across waves.
The case suggested in Section 3.2, in which female migration is on average associated
with lower but more certain expected wages than male migration is confirmed in the data:
Table 3.5: Expected Returns and Risk from Migration Portfolios (log).
Men Women
E(wdi ) 16.218 15.945
[.516] [.360]
V ar(wdi ) 16.390 15.912
[.881] [.556]
Cov(wdi , w
h
j ) 32.051 32.030
[1.235] [.902]
E(Ri) 16.029 16.046
[.408] [.347]
σi 16.177 16.106
[.788] [.566]
*Standard deviations reported in brackets
Table 3.5, as well as Figures 3.2 and 3.3, show that while the expected value and
variance of wages of female migrants at destination are stochastically dominated by the
expected value and variance of wages of male migrants, once we combine the assets into
portfolios as described above the difference becomes much less significant.
In line with the model of section 3.2, I will introduce in the regressions a measure of
risk aversion, which will be included as a control variable on its own and then as an in-
strumental variable when interacted with the level of risk of respectively male and female
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Figure 3.2: Expected Wages and Returns from Migration Portfolios
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Figure 3.3: Expected Risk from Migration Portfolios
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migration. Risk aversion is captured in the IFLS through a number of questions in which
individuals are faced with a series of lotteries with hypothetical high stakes and, depending
on the path of answers they give, they are assigned a level of risk aversion between 0 and
4. Assuming that decisions are taken jointly by the spouses and that there is assortative
matching on risk aversion, I use the level of risk aversion of the head of the household or,
if that is missing, I take the level of risk aversion of the spouse.
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In terms of validity of these instruments I imagine that households will make their
migration decision based on the information they have about the possibilities they might
have at destination, thus it is reasonable to believe that the experience of previous mi-
grants best represents the information set available to potential migrants.
On the other hand, the excludability of these instrumental variables is less straight-
forward: in order for the wages of previous migrants not to be directly correlated with
the outcome variables, I will need to assume that they are not influenced by unobserved
characteristics of the migrant but are somehow exogenous and thus non migrants would
be faced with the same wages if they migrated. Such assumption is supported by the
data reported by the Indonesian Statistical Office (BPS, 2007) about jobs of international
migrants which I mentioned in section 3.3 : there is very little variation in the type of jobs
that migrants get upon migration and they are all low skilled jobs, for this reason we can
reasonably assume that the wages are fixed and exogenous. Moreover, at least for women,
there is vast anecdotal evidence that they are hired to go work abroad as domestic workers
under standard contracts that specify the same wage and duration of employment for all
(Suradji, 2004; Patel and Vella, 2007).
3.5 Results
In order to estimate Equation 3.8, I first need to to create a measure of total household in-
come. To do so I follow Dai et al. (2011) who have estimated the distribution of household
income using the same data from the fourth wave of the IFLS. As in their study, income is
computed as the summation of five components: labor income; income from agricultural
business; income from non agricultural business; household non labour income (scholar-
ships, pensions, other transfers); household assets income.
Following Dai et al. (2011) I have also estimated income for households for which it was
missing using a two step Heckman procedure that exploits a dummy variable for whether
the respondent is the head of the household to predict the probability of response in the
first stage. Table 3.7 shows descriptive statistics for the levels of household income (actual
and predicted) and expenditure for households with migrant fathers and households with
migrant mothers, together with the shares of (predicted) income allocated to the various
types of commodities.
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Equation 3.8 is first estimated through OLS, the results are reported in Table 3.9 and
show that households in which mothers have migrated spend significantly more on adult
goods.10 The shift is about six percentage points, while the difference on expenditure on
other types of goods is not significant. The results are robust to the inclusion of a set of
control variables derived from table 3.6.
If households from which mothers migrate are poorer, more rural and less educated
than households from which fathers migrate (table 3.6), then for example the OLS coeffi-
cient associated to non food items or that associated to education will likely be downward
biased. For this reason, in order to control for the possibility that households from which
mothers migrate differ from those from which it is the father who leaves, I proceed to
estimate equation 3.8 by Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS).
Table 3.10 shows the results of the First Stage regression: columns (1)-(3) use only the
destination side of the migration portfolios and show that female migration arises when
it is associated with higher expected returns and lower variance than male migration;
columns (4)-(6) then use the measures of expected returns and risk of migration portfolios
constructed according to equations 3.1 and 3.2. The signs still confirm the existence of a
trade off between expected returns and expected risk.
For all specifications, the last three rows of the table report the values of the Cragg
Donald F Statistic of excluded instruments (Cragg and Donald, 1993) and of the Hansen
J test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982) with its p-value for the cases in which
the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables (all columns ex-
cept 1 and 4). A first look at these values convinces us that the best set of instruments to
employ is that of columns (2)-(3), i.e. the relative measures of profitability and riskiness of
female versus male migration, as the F statistic is highest and the test of overidentifying
restrictions does not reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are exogenous.
Table 3.11 then shows the results of the TSLS estimation of equation 3.8. If we compare
these results with those of the OLS, we observe that the increase in adult expenditures is
larger than it was in the OLS, while the decrease of non food items becomes non signifi-
cant. The results are in line with what the model in section 3.2.2 predicts: the difference
in the share of household income devoted to investment on children (here expenditure on
10These are coffee, tea, tobacco and alcohol. The use of adult goods to detect son preferences has been
suggested by Deaton (1997)
111
food, health and education) is not significantly different between households from which
the man migrated and households from which it was the woman that migrated. This was
due to the possibility of the migrant spouse to control the amount of remittances to send
back home in a way so as to offset the shifts in the allocation of the household budget
that would be made by the spouse left behind.
On the other hand, the model was predicting that the share of household income de-
voted to adult’s private consumption when the woman migrated was x∗m = α(1−β) while
the share of household income devoted to adult private consumption when it was the man
that migrated was x∗∗f = β(1− α).
The coefficient estimated in column (5) of table 3.11 is thus the difference between the
two shares: α(1− β)− β(1− α) = α− β > 0.
The associated positive sign thus confirms that men have a larger preference for private
consumption over investment on children than women and that this difference ranges be-
tween 13.6 and 18.6 percentage points. In other words men’s preferences are such that
they would like to spend around 15 percentage points more than women on private con-
sumption rather than on expenditure on common goods.
I compare these estimates with the existing literature on models of intra household al-
location to verify their validity. Many authors have provided robust evidence that women
have stronger preferences for consumption on common goods than men do: Thomas (1990),
Lundberg et al. (1994), Duflo (2001), Qian (2008), Ashraf (2009) all show that income
accruing to women generates larger benefits for children than that accruing to men. Un-
fortunately it is generally difficult to compare the magnitude of their estimates with those
found in this paper because typically both the outcome and the explanatory variables are
defined differently. Nevertheless I believe that there are at least two papers which contain
comparable estimates as they use as outcome variables the shifts in the shares of household
expenditure like I do. Aggregating their shares in a way that is comparable to the one
used in this paper, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) show that the shares of the household
budget allocated to adult goods are between 3.2 and 6.6 percentage points lower in the
case in which the woman earns the whole household budget with respect to the case in
which it is the man. Similarly Attanasio and Lechene (2002) find that a 100% increase
of the woman’s household income share generates a decrease in the share of expenditure
allocated to alcohol and tobacco between 19 and 40 percentage points. The two papers
just cited do not provide an exact test of the model introduced in this paper because the
presence of the spouse, even when she does not contribute to the household’s income at
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all, is likely to affect the choice of how to allocate it.
Another paper I would like to relate my results to is then Ashraf (2009): she uses an
experimental setting in the Philippines to test whether husbands and wives have different
preferences over the allocation of the household budget and how information and commu-
nication affect their choices. Interestingly, she shows that in situations in which one of the
spouses receives a temporary shock to income and the other spouse is not able to control
how he spends this extra budget (in the setting of her experiment this is the “Private”
treatment), 60.4% of men versus 52.1% of women choose to deposit that money on their
own private account rather than converting it into food vouchers. This is a rough test
of the difference in the “generosity” parameters included in the parents’ utility functions
described in section 3.2: this difference can be interpreted as α − β = 8.3%, a number
quite close to the estimates of table 3.13.
3.6 Robustness Checks
The first concern I have relates to the possibility that the instruments employed might be
weak : if they do not have enough explanatory power in the first stage then TSLS estimates
risk to be biased towards the corresponding OLS estimates.
A general test of the weakness of the instruments is based on the analysis of the F-statistic
(Stock and Yogo, 2002): it can be proved that whenever this gets small, the bias of TSLS
approaches that of OLS. In order to assess whether the F statistic of the excluded instru-
ments is big enough, I follow Stock and Yogo (2002) and compare the value of the Cragg
Donald F Statistic with the threshold values they tabulated. I find that the Cragg Don-
ald F statistic of my TSLS only exceeds the critical value corresponding to 20% size of test.
The bias in TSLS is an increasing function of the number of instruments employed,
while the just identified TSLS is approximately unbiased. For this reason my first test of
the robustness of the coefficients estimated consists in estimating equation 3.8 using only
the most powerful instrument I have, namely E(wdf )/E(w
d
m). Results are reported in Ta-
ble 3.12: the F Statistic is now high enough to exceed the 15% critical value as tabulated
by Stock and Yogo (2002); the difference between households with migrant mothers and
households with migrant fathers in their allocation of the household budget to adult goods
is now larger than in the baseline TSLS, which confirms that the latter is slightly biased
towards the OLS estimator. Nevertheless none of the coefficients estimated in this table
is statistically different from those of table 3.11 as the test in the last row confirms.
113
In the case of overidentified models, the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (LIML) is median-unbiased. This estimator performs particularly well in small
samples and whenever the number of instruments is large. Stock et al. (2002) have com-
pared the critical values for the weak instrument test based on the first stage F Statistic
for a number of estimators and showed that, whenever the model is overidentified, the
LIML is the estimator with the lowest threshold values for the F Statistic. They also show
that LIML and Fuller-k estimator (with α = 1) generally have smaller critical values than
TSLS. For this reason, in table 3.13, I have reestimated the model using a set of alternative
estimators for which the critical values for the F Statistic are lower. In the table I also
report the corresponding critical values tabulated by Stock and Yogo (2002). As expected,
the LIML estimates are the most unbiased ones as the value of the F Statistic exceeds the
10% critical value of 8.68.
Table 3.13 also includes estimates with two Fuller-k estimators (Fuller, 1977). When
errors are normally distributed and instruments are fixed, the Fuller-k with α = 1 is best
unbiased to second order (Rothenberg, 1984). While the critical values for the F Statistic
are not significantly lower than those for TSLS, this estimator has been proved to yield
more precise estimates than both TSLS and LIML when instruments are weak. Fuller
(1980) has shown that for an estimator of the coefficients in the linear model, the value
α = 4 yields smaller mean squared error than any smaller value of α, while α = 1 gives a
nearly unbiased estimator. Both Fuller estimators anyway generate a substantial reduc-
tion in the mean square error (MSE) relative to TSLS and LIML. In table 3.13 both these
estimators produce coefficients that are very close to the TSLS and LIML ones, with the
Fuller-k with α = 1 being closer to the LIML and the Fuller-k with α = 4 almost equal to
the TSLS.
As predicted by Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999), the absolute magnitude of the co-
efficients estimated through LIML is slightly larger than the TSLS estimates, as are the
standard errors, but the fact that the difference between the coefficients estimated with
the different procedures is negligible reinforces our hypothesis that the instruments have
enough predictive power. Indeed, if they were weak, the TSLS estimates would have been
much closer to the OLS ones than to the LIML ones.
Although the test of overidentifying restrictions has systematically not rejected the
hypothesis that the instruments are not directly correlated to the outcome variables, I
have performed a further test of exogeneity of the instruments. As specified in section 3.4,
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the instruments I am employing are essentially time (of migration) and village specific.
One might therefore be concerned that some villages have unobserved characteristics that
have traditionally pushed their migrants to a certain destination and therefore, while the
wages at destination are exogenous, the destination itself would not. For example it might
be the case that a village that is very badly connected through infrastructures has less
probability of sending its migrants overseas. In particular one needs to make sure that it
is not the case that poorer villages systematically send women to more attractive destina-
tions than men. If that was the case then I may well be concerned about the fact that my
results are driven by village specific unobserved characteristics (for example lack of schools
and other infrastructures). I thus regress a number of village specific characteristics on
our instruments to check that there is no correlation between the two. The results are
reported in table 3.14 and show no clear pattern of correlations which gives us enough
confidence about the actual exogeneity of our instruments.
As a last check I performed some Montecarlo simulations to assess the robustness of
the estimates. I have drawn 1000 random samples, adequately calibrated to reproduce
the correlation between endogenous and outcome variable of the real sample, and I have
estimated the TSLS and the LIML coefficients for each drawn.
Table 3.15 reports the averages and standard deviations of the coefficients estimates, to-
gether with the corresponding Cragg Donald F Statistic, the p-value of the test of overi-
dentifying restrictions and the confidence interval corresponding to the test of equality
between the coefficient estimated from the simulated sample and the ones estimated from
the real sample and reported in table 3.13. The coefficients estimated are very similar
to those of table 3.11, I do not reject that they are equal in more than 95% of the cases
(coverage). Moreover the F Statistic is now systematically larger than 10, which is above
the 20% level of the Stock and Yogo (2002) critical values for the TSLS, and above the
10% one for the LIML estimator. Finally, the test of overidentifying restrictions leaves us
little doubt about the possibility that the instruments are not exogenous.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper I looked at the effects of parental migration on investments on children left
behind. The main concern is that migration of one of the spouses may be associated with
a shift of resources away from the children due to a moral hazard problem; as the migrant
would lose the ability to observe the behavior of the spouse left behind, this would create
for the latter incentives to shift away resources from the common good (investment on
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children) onto the private ones. I find that when the migrant decides how much to send
back home in the form of remittances and, subsequently, the spouse left behind chooses
how to allocate the available budget within the household, the Subgame Perfect Nash
equilibrium is one in which the share of total income devoted to children is the same no
matter which of his parents migrates. This is because remittances act as a device in the
hands of the migrant for controlling the decisions of the spouse left behind.
In order to account for the problems of endogenous selection implied, I modeled the
decision of the household with regard to which member to send out for migration as a
returns/risk comparison and I showed that households prefer to send the member who
is expected to earn more upon migration and whose earnings will be less volatile (less
risky). For this reason households which are more risk averse will prefer to send away for
migration the spouse whose earnings upon migration are expected to be less uncertain,
even if lower; this is generally the case of female migration.
I tested the predictions of this model on data from Indonesia, where female migration is
particularly high, and showed that the share of total income devoted to children related
expenditure does not change significantly between the case in which the father migrates
and that in which it is the mother that leaves.
I also proved that the difference in the share of total household income devoted to private
adult consumption between the case in which the mother migrates and that in which it
is the father is positive and reflects the difference in tastes for private consumption, as
predicted by the model of section 3.2. The difference between fathers’ and mothers’ “gen-
erosity” is around 15 percentage points.
The findings of this paper indicate that female migration has no detrimental effects on
their children, compared to migration of the father, as long as the migrant mothers have
the possibility of sending remittances in an efficient way. For this reason it is crucial to
improve the quality of remittance services as only this allows migrant women to ensure
that their children receive all the cares they desire.
Further research should broaden the research question addressed in this paper to es-
timate the total effect of parental migration on children by comparing children with one
migrant parent with children with none. Finally studying the effects of the feminization of
migration on children left behind should include some analysis of the behaviors of female
migrants upon return to their country of origin and to their household. The experience
acquired by such women during their migration spell will presumably induce significant
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changes in the household’s decision making process, changes which might eventually gen-
erate further benefits for the children.
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3.8 Tables and Figures
Table 3.6: Households’ Characteristics. IFLS 2007.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Non Migrant Migrant Migrant Difference
Households Father Mother (2) - (3)
Size of Household 4.012 4.574 4.605 -0.031
(1.981) (1.944) (1.798)
Rural 0.451 0.519 0.671 -0.152***
(0.498) (0.501) (0.471)
Muslim 0.890 0.930 0.958 -0.028
(0.313) (0.255) (0.202)
Number of Children (< 18) 1.237 2.043 2.072 -0.029
(1.183) (1.113) (1.055)
Age of Children 8.749 9.722 10.41 -0.688*
(4.797) (3.749) (3.303)
Gender of Children 0.495 0.475 0.500 -0.025
(0.406) (0.364) (0.361)
Years of Education Mother 8.280 7.638 7.027 0.611*
(3.841) (3.648) (2.762)
log Total Expenditure 15.36 15.18 14.95 0.23***
(1.034) (0.875) (0.688)
Standard deviations reported in parenthesis
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Table 3.7: Household income levels and shares
(1) (2)
Migrant Migrant
Father Mother
log Total Income 15.67 15.895
(actual values) (1.287) (1.081)
[193] [133]
log Total Income 16.251 16.264
(predicted values) (0.717) (0.621)
[254] [147]
log Total Expenditure 15.15 14.93
(0.905) (0.659)
[255] [148]
Shares of total
income spent on:
Food 0.764 0.582
(0.858) (0.667)
[254] [147]
Non Food 2.025 0.398
(14.923) (0.435)
[254] [147]
Education 0.171 0.137
(0.304) (0.157)
[254] [147]
Health 0.058 0.027
(0.292) (0.094)
[254] [147]
Adult 0.06 0.107
(0.133) (0.133)
[254] [147]
Standard deviations reported in parentheses.
Number of observations reported in brackets.
Non food items include: Electricity, Water, Fuel, Tele-
phone, Personal Toiletries, Household items, Domestic
Services, Recreation and Entertainment, Transportation,
Sweepstakes, Clothing for children and adults, Household
Supplies and Furniture, Ritual Ceremonies, Charities and
Gifts, Taxes, Others such as Cars, Television Sets, Mobile
Phones, etc..
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Table 3.8: Household gender specific destinations, 2007
Destination Assigned Men Women
No. % No. %
Sumatra 1 0.01
N Aceh Darussalem 4 0.03 9 0.07
North Sumatra 824 6.16 702 5.3
West Sumatra 264 1.97 302 2.28
Riau 99 0.74 51 0.39
Jambi 0 0
South Sumatra 526 3.93 406 3.06
Bengkulu 2 0.01
Lampung 594 4.44 389 2.93
Riau Islands 1 0
Jakarta 1,609 12.02 1655 12.49
West Java 3,237 24.19 2583 19.49
Central Jawa 1,798 13.43 1909 14.41
Yogyakarta 249 1.86 251 1.89
East Jawa 2,301 17.2 2616 19.74
Banten 46 0.35 13 0.1
Bali 289 2.16 246 1.86
West Nusa Tenggara 307 2.29 259 1.96
Central Kalimantan 12 0.09
South Kalimantan 279 2.08 273 2.06
East Kalimantan 24 0.18 65 0.49
Central Sulawesi 37 0.28
Nort Sulawesi 15 0.11
South Sulawesi 401 3 389 2.94
Southeast Sulawesi 32 0.24
West Sulawesi 1 0.01
Irian Jaya 2 0.02
Malaysia 459 3.43 263 1.98
Singapore 4 0.03
Taiwan 3 0.02
Saudi Arabia 2 0.01 749 5.65
Timor Leste 4 0.03
United Arab Emirates 74 0.56
Total 13,380 100 13249 100
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Table 3.9: OLS Estimation. Household Level.
Shares of Total Household Income spent on:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food Non Food Education Health Adult
A. No controls
Migrant Mother -0.206** -1.961 -0.038 -0.028 0.056***
(0.096) (1.382) (0.030) (0.020) (0.017)
Size of Household -0.402*** 1.515 0.103 -0.456 -0.003
(0.104) (2.575) (0.178) (0.300) (0.078)
Observations 337 337 337 337 337
R2 0.053 0.009 0.023 0.051 0.045
B. Controls included
Migrant Mother -0.104 -0.632 -0.012 -0.019 0.062***
(0.079) (0.724) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
Size of Household -0.032 3.861* -0.036 -0.080 0.000
(0.099) (2.077) (0.031) (0.052) (0.019)
Observations 337 337 337 337 337
R2 0.376 0.338 0.097 0.064 0.078
Controls are: Rural Household, Education of Mother, log Total Household Expenditure
Standard errors robust to village level clustering in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: First Stage Regression.
Migrant Mother
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
E(wdf )/E(w
d
m) 0.149*** 0.297*** 0.315*** 0.308***
(0.057) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099)
V ar(wdf )/V ar(w
d
m) -0.092* -0.089* 0.039
(0.048) (0.048) (0.106)
RA× V ar(wdf )/V ar(wdm) -0.032
(0.026)
E(Rf )/E(Rm) 0.059 0.241 0.365** 0.383**
(0.069) (0.185) (0.180) (0.174)
σf/σm -0.089 -0.114 0.003
(0.081) (0.079) (0.128)
RA× σf/σm -0.030
(0.031)
Observations 379 372 337 321 377 369 334 318
R2 0.026 0.046 0.081 0.090 0.002 0.010 0.053 0.066
F Statistic 10.03 8.604 9.374 6.437 0.746 1.919 4.017 3.317
Controls are: Rural Household, Education of Mother, log Total Household Expenditure
Standard errors robust to village level clustering in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.11: Two Stage Least Squares Estimation. Household Level.
Shares of Total Household Income spent on:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food Non Food Education Health Adult
A. No controls
Migrant Mother 0.026 -3.190 -0.082 0.089 0.165**
(0.335) (5.009) (0.112) (0.150) (0.083)
Size of Household -0.419*** -1.450 -0.074*** -0.114 -0.027
(0.102) (1.289) (0.023) (0.070) (0.022)
Observations 337 337 337 337 337
Uncentered R2 0.443 0.0208 0.278 0.0163 0.162
F Statistic 8.604 8.604 8.604 8.604 8.604
Hansen J Statistic 0.847 1.290 1.025 1.018 0.812
p-value 0.357 0.256 0.311 0.313 0.367
B. Controls included
Migrant Mother -0.293 -8.203 -0.082 0.082 0.149**
(0.337) (7.552) (0.102) (0.135) (0.074)
Size of Household -0.027 4.077* -0.034 -0.083 -0.002
(0.102) (2.316) (0.030) (0.054) (0.021)
Observations 337 337 337 337 337
Uncentered R2 0.633 0.262 0.329 0.0652 0.230
F Statistic 9.374 9.374 9.374 9.374 9.374
Hansen J Statistic 0.723 0.908 0.775 0.771 0.637
p-value 0.395 0.341 0.379 0.380 0.425
Controls are: Rural Household, Education of Mother, log Total Household Expenditure
Standard errors robust to village level clustering in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.12: Robustness Checks: IV Estimates, only one instrument
Shares of Total Household Income spent on:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food Non Food Education Health Adult
Migrant Mother -0.153 -5.750 -0.017 0.150 0.186**
(0.342) (6.156) (0.126) (0.158) (0.087)
Size of Household -0.031 4.007* -0.036 -0.085 -0.003
(0.100) (2.226) (0.029) (0.057) (0.022)
Observations 337 337 337 337 337
Uncentered R2 0.639 0.309 0.341 -0.000855 0.155
F Statistic 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03 14.03
χ2 test 0.17 0.11 0.41 0.26 0.24
p-value 0.677 0.745 0.521 0.612 0.623
Controls are: Rural Household, Education of Mother, log Total Household Expenditure
Excluded Instrument: E(wdf )/E(w
d
m)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
χ2 test: null is that coefficients estimated are not statistically different from those of table 3.11
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.13: Robustness Checks: Weak Instruments
Shares of Total Household Expenditure Cragg -Donald Stock-Yogo weak ID
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) F Statistic test critical values
Food Non Food Education Health Adult 10% 20% 30%
OLS -0.104 -0.632 -0.012 -0.019 0.062***
(0.079) (0.724) (0.022) (0.019) (0.017)
TSLS -0.293 -8.203 -0.082 0.082 0.149** 9.374 19.93 8.75 7.25
(0.337) (7.552) (0.102) (0.135) (0.074)
IV -0.153 -5.750 -0.017 0.150 0.186** 14.03 16.38 6.66
(0.342) (6.156) (0.126) (0.158) (0.087)
LIML -0.299 -8.498 -0.086 0.088 0.154** 9.374 8.68 4.42 3.92
(0.348) (7.873) (0.107) (0.143) (0.078)
Fuller (α = 1) -0.288 -8.063 -0.081 0.082 0.149** 9.374 10.89 9 7.49
(0.329) (7.400) (0.101) (0.135) (0.073)
Fuller (α = 4) -0.262 -6.995 -0.071 0.067 0.136** 9.374 10.89 9 7.49
(0.282) (6.277) (0.087) (0.116) (0.062)
Controls: Rural Household, Education of Mother, log Total Household Expenditure
Standard errors robust to village level clustering in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.14: Robustness Checks: Exogenous Instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
% of Households Elementary Junior High Number of Health Distance to Distance to
with electricity Schools Schools Midwives Posts Coach Station Post Office
E(wdf )/E(w
d
m) -5.901 -0.599 0.316 -0.115 0.950 23.984 -0.950
(4.430) (0.499) (0.283) (0.106) (1.233) (21.131) (1.940)
V ar(wdf )/V ar(w
d
m) 3.782** 0.293 -0.336** 0.015 0.264 -11.480 -1.190
(1.815) (0.226) (0.163) (0.048) (0.540) (8.781) (0.872)
Observations 12,217 12,766 12,686 8,796 12,190 9,229 10,183
R2 0.0188 0.0046 0.0217 0.0056 0.0155 0.0105 0.0299
Unit of observation is household
Standard errors robust to village level clustering in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.15: Robustness Checks: Montecarlo Simulations
Shares of Total Household Expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food Non Food Education Health Adult
OLS -0.104 -0.623 -0.011 -0.020 0.062
(0.079) (1.171) (0.033) (0.028) (0.016)
TSLS -0.113 -2.556 -0.084 0.068 0.14
(0.348) (4.922) (0.141) (0.124) (0.075)
Coverage [0.969] [0.962] [0.964] [0.964] [0.951]
Cragg Donald F 10.669 10.693 10.723 10.719 10.624
Hansen J Statistic - pvalue 0.502 0.503 0.503 0.502 0.504
LIML -0.113 -2.744 -0.092 0.074 0.146
(0.393) (5.571) (0.164) (0.139) (0.084)
Coverage [0.968] [0.968] [0.965] [0.968] [0.956]
Cragg Donald F 10.669 10.693 10.723 10.719 10.624
Hansen J Statistic - pvalue 0.504 0.505 0.506 0.505 0.508
Standard Deviations in parenthesis
Number of iterations = 1,000
Coverage is the frequency with which the hypothesis of equality between coefficient estimated from actual sample
and coefficient estimated from simulated sample has not been rejected
Controls included
Standard errors robust to village level clustering
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